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PRIVATE COMPANY LIES 
 
Elizabeth Pollman** 
 
Forthcoming GEO. L.J. 2020 
 
 
 
Rule 10b-5’s antifraud catch-all is one of the most consequential pieces of 
American administrative law and most highly developed areas of judicially-created 
federal law. Although the rule broadly prohibits securities fraud in both public and 
private company stock, the vast majority of jurisprudence, and the voluminous 
academic literature that accompanies it, has developed through a public company 
lens.  
 
This Article illuminates how the explosive growth of private markets has left 
huge portions of U.S. capital markets with relatively light securities fraud scrutiny 
and enforcement. Some of the largest private companies by valuation grow in an 
environment of extreme information asymmetry and with the pressure, 
opportunity, and rationalizing culture that can foster misconduct and deception. 
Many investors in the private markets are sophisticated and can bear high levels of 
risk and significant losses from securities fraud. It is increasingly evident, however, 
that private company lies can harm a broader range of shareholders and 
stakeholders as well as the efficiency of allocating billions of dollars for innovation 
and new business. In response to this underappreciated problem, this Article 
explores a range of mechanisms to improve accountability in the private markets 
and ultimately argues for greater public oversight and enforcement. 
	
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. For helpful conversations and 
comments, thanks to Yifat Aran, Miriam Baer, Carlos Berdejó, Ryan Bubb, Elisabeth de 
Fontenay, Jill Fisch, Jeff Gordon, Zack Gubler, Dave Hoffman, Kate Judge, Ann Lipton, 
Dorothy Lund, Frank Partnoy, Ed Rock, Eric Talley, Urska Velikonja, Yesha Yadav, and 
participants at the Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law faculty 
workshop, BYU Winter Deals Conference, Tulane Corporate and Securities Roundtable, and 
the Law & Economics Workshop at Columbia Law School and NYU School of Law.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the world’s great inventors, Thomas Edison, bemoaned the propensity 
of technologists to lie about an exciting new invention of the late-nineteenth 
century, the storage battery. In Edison’s words: “The storage battery is, in my 
opinion, a catchpenny, a sensation, a mechanism for swindling the public by stock 
companies…Just as soon as a man gets working on the secondary battery, it brings 
out his latent capacity for lying.”1  
More than a century later, CEO-founder Elizabeth Holmes of blood testing 
startup Theranos found inspiration in Edison—but rather than making the world a 
better place, she created a company valued at over $9 billion dollars that was nothing 
more than a dangerous house of cards.2 At age nineteen, Holmes dropped out of 
Stanford University to develop groundbreaking blood-testing technology that could 
use just a drop of blood.3 Over the next dozen years, Holmes became a celebrity 
CEO-founder, raising over $700 million from investors, building a board with high-
profile directors, and claiming that she had developed a revolutionary portable 
blood analyzer.4  
Reporting by the Wall Street Journal exposed a devastatingly different story told 
by employees who suggested that Theranos had falsified lab records to make it look 
like its blood testing technology met the industry standard.5 According to 
employees, the vast majority of tests that Theranos offered to consumers were 
actually being run on commercial devices made by third-party manufacturers. The 
small number of blood tests being run on Theranos devices were unreliable and 
posed a public health threat to consumers.6 Under Holmes’ leadership, the company 
operated in a highly secretive manner, with “information compartmentalized so that 
only she had the full picture of the system’s development.”7 As a matter of 
corporate governance, she had super-majority voting stock that allowed her to 
maintain control of the company.8 
The SEC launched an investigation, finding that in addition to misleading 
representations about the state of Theranos technology, Elizabeth Holmes and 
another executive had told investors that the company would generate more than 
$100 million of revenue in 2014, but in fact had barely $100,000 of revenue that 
	
1 The Electrician (London) Feb. 17, 1883, p. 329, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=j7jmAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA329#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
2 John Carreyrou, SEC Charges Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes With Fraud, WALL ST. J. (March 
14, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-charges-theranos-and-founder-elizabeth-holmes-
with-fraud-1521045648. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 JOHN CARREYROU, BAD BLOOD: SECRETS AND LIES IN A SILICON VALLEY STARTUP 20, 33. 
(2018). 
8 Id. at 36, 50-51. 
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year.9 These revelations spurred the spectacular fall of the company, going from a 
$9 billion valuation to virtually zero, and Holmes settled fraud charges with the SEC 
in 2018.10 Criminal charges are currently pending against Holmes and she could face 
up to twenty years in prison.11  
Theranos rings the alarm bell on securities fraud in the private market. Telling 
lies in connection with the purchase or sale of stock is not new, of course, and dates 
back to before Edison’s time.12 But since twentieth-century securities law created 
the notion of a public-private company divide, securities fraud on the private side 
of the line has received little attention because in conventional accounts this market 
features only sophisticated investors who can fend for themselves. A different 
reality, however, has started to become clear—the zone of impact extends farther 
and may include retail investors exposed to private companies through mutual and 
pension funds and employees who hold a stake in private companies through their 
stock options. Ripple effects reach other stakeholders as well, such as consumers 
who use a company’s product or services, like those who received faulty blood tests 
from Theranos.13 Moreover, the relative dearth of enforcement in the private 
market, which is surging in size and may have rampant securities fraud, gives rise to 
serious concerns about efficient capital allocation for funding innovation that drives 
our economic growth and deadweight costs that investors might incur to protect 
themselves. 
Consider another example. WeWork, a shared workspace startup, went from 
having Goldman Sachs publicize a $60 to $90 billion valuation for its initial public 
offering (IPO) to teetering on the brink of bankruptcy within just 33 days.14 Upon 
releasing information for the planned offering, public market investors responded 
with scathing criticism of the company’s losses and corporate governance—
WeWork shelved the IPO plans and its private valuation of $47 billion plummeted 
by 70% almost immediately.15 The CEO-founder parachuted out of the company 	
9 Carreyrou, supra note 2. In addition, the SEC found that Holmes had falsely claimed that 
Theranos’ products were deployed by the U.S. Department of Defense on the battlefield in 
Afghanistan. Id. 
10 Id.; U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Theranos, CEO Holmes, and Former 
President Balwani Charged With Massive Fraud, Mar. 14, 2018, 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-41. 
11 Peter J. Henning, What’s Next for Elizabeth Holmes in the Theranos Fraud Case?, N.Y. TIMES (June 
18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/business/dealbook/holmes-theranos-
fraud-case.html.  
12 EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, FRAUD: AN AMERICAN HISTORY FROM BARNUM TO MADOFF 9 
(2017) (discussing the history of policing business fraud). 
13 For a discussion of harm to non-shareholders from securities fraud, see Urska Velikonja, The 
Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887 (2013). 
14 Dakin Campbell, How WeWork Spiraled From a $47 Billion Valuation to Talk of Bankruptcy in Just 
6 Weeks, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 28, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/weworks-
nightmare-ipo; Peter Eavis & Michael J. de la Merced, WeWork I.P.O. Is Withdrawn as Investors 
Grow Wary, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/30/business/wework-ipo.html. 
15 Campbell, supra note 14. 
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with a $1.7 billion payout, while various investors faced steep losses—as did over 
ten thousand employees whose stock options went to zero.16 Reverberations may 
be felt in markets around the world as property owners take losses on 
improvements made for WeWork and other startups struggle to get out of the gate 
in a tarnished IPO market.17 The SEC is currently investigating WeWork for rule 
violations in its abandoned public stock issuance—and it remains to be seen 
whether the extensive conflicts and irregular financial reporting that have come to 
light might portend possible securities fraud violations going back to the decade-
long period in which the company raised money privately in relative darkness 
without the regulator’s scrutiny.18  
Notably, the federal antifraud catch-all of Rule 10b-5 applies to both public and 
private company securities.19 This provision, promulgated under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, is the “principal font of the law of securities fraud” and “can 
make a plausible claim to being the most consequential piece of American 
administrative law.”20 Chief Justice Rehnquist famously remarked that the law of 
Rule 10b-5 is “a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative 
acorn.”21 Indeed, securities fraud is “one of the most heavily judicially created 	
16 Id.; Eliot Brown, WeWork Employee Options Underwater as Ex-CEO Reaps, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 
2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wework-employees-feel-sting-as-ex-ceo-stands-to-reap-
11571870011?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=2;  
17 Campbell, supra note 14; Joshua Franklin & Lance Tupper, After WeWork Debacle, IPO Market 
Slams Brakes on Unprofitable Companies, REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2019), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-ipo/after-wework-debacle-ipo-market-slams-brakes-
on-unprofitable-companies-idUSKBN1WC1WY. The company’s largest investor, SoftBank, 
has struggled to raise another fund to deploy private capital into startups working on new 
technologies. Anirban Sen, SoftBank’s Plans for Second Mega-Fund Hit by WeWork Debacle, REUTERS 
(Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-softbank-group-visionfund-
insight/softbanks-plans-for-second-mega-fund-hit-by-wework-debacle-idUSKBN1WJ0AA. 
18 See Matt Robinson, Robert Schmidt & Ellen Huet, WeWork Is Facing SEC Inquiry Into Possible 
Rule Violations, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-15/wework-is-said-to-face-sec-inquiry-
into-possible-rule-violations (noting the SEC observed that the irregular financing reporting of 
WeWork might have been “misleading”). WeWork shareholders have already brought a breach 
of fiduciary duty suit and the possibility of a Rule 10b-5 securities fraud suit hangs in the air as 
some of the company’s investors claim to have been unaware of the extent of the alleged self-
dealing, having been granted neither financial materials nor disclosures prior to the release of its 
IPO prospectus. Rey Mashayekhi, WeWork’s Legal Floodgates May Have Just Opened, FORTUNE 
(Nov. 19, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/11/19/wework-softbank-takeover-lawsuits/. 
19 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (“in connection with the purchase or sale of any security”). 
20 See Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 540, n.84 (2011) (noting “[t]he 
rule has sparked thousands of lawsuits, causing billions of dollars to change hands”, “routinely 
spawned headlines in the nation’s leading papers”, and has “sent hundreds of people to prison, 
some for decades”). 
21 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975); see also LOSS, SELIGMAN 
& PAREDES, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1285-86 (6th ed. 2011) (“The Rule 
10b-5 story tempts the pen, for it is difficult to think of another instance in the entire corpus juris 
in which the interaction of the legislative, administrative rulemaking and judicial processes has 
produced so much from so little.”). 
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bodies of federal law”22—but this voluminous case law, and the related scholarly 
literature, has focused primarily on public corporations and markets.23  
This state of the world, with Rule 10b-5 actions generally aimed at public 
corporations and little regard given to private corporations, sufficed for a time. 
Most corporations of significant size were publicly reporting and traded on national 
securities exchanges, exposed to the threat of class action lawsuits brought by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys using case law that enabled aggregate litigation seeking 
compensatory damages.24 By contrast, private placements were generally composed 
of sophisticated investors and there was little secondary trading of private company 
stock.25 Startups were on an average timeline to be acquired or go public within a 
few years, and valuations did not surpass, or even approach, a billion dollars.  
This twentieth-century model of a dominant public capital market has been 
transformed. Capital formation through private placements has exploded in the past 
decade. Non-registered securities offerings totaled more than $3 trillion in 2017—
far outpacing public offerings for stocks and bonds.26 Companies have stayed 
private longer on average, fewer companies have gone public, and those that do 
tend to be larger in size.27 In simple terms, this means that a significant part of the 
lifecycle of a growth company is typically occurring on the private rather than the 
public market. For example, if Amazon, Google, and Salesforce had stayed private 
for the “new normal”—an average of 12 years—an additional $197 billion in 	
22 Buell, supra note 20, at 545; see also Steven Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 463 (1990) (“With the explosive growth of rule 
l0b-5 litigation, courts and private plaintiffs have assumed by default a substantial segment of 
the policy-setting powers that Congress delegated to the SEC in 1934.”). 
23 The vast scholarly literature on Rule 10b-5 securities fraud focuses on issues related to public 
companies. The literature discussing private companies and Rule 10b-5 is comparatively scarce: 
Carlos Berdejó, Small Investments, Big Losses: The States’ Role in Protecting Local Investors from Securities 
Fraud, 92 WASH. L. REV. 567, 581 (2017); Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: 
Employee Stock Options and Rule 10b-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2003); Kenneth J. Black, Note, Private 
Equity & Private Suits: Using 10b-5 Antifraud Suits to Discipline a Transforming Industry, 2 MICH. J. 
PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL L. 271 (2013); Jonathan D. Glater, Hurdles of Different 
Heights for Securities Fraud Litigants of Different Types, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 47; Elizabeth 
Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179 (2012); Robert E. Steinberg, 
Note, A New Approach to Rule 10b-5: Distinguishing the Close Corporation, 1978 WASH. U. L. Q. 733 
(1978). 
24 See infra Section I.B. 
25 See Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 151, 152 
(2010) (“At one time, federal law confined private placements to purchasers who were 
sophisticated in business affairs and could, in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, ‘fend for 
themselves.’”); Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 21 
(2012) (“Before the direct market came about, the transaction costs of trying to sell 
noncontrolling interests in private start-ups were prohibitive.”). 
26 Scott Bauguess, Rachita Gullapalli, & Vladimir Ivanov, Capital Raising in the U.S.: An Analysis 
of the Market for Unregistered Securities Offerings, 2009-2017, SEC (Aug. 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/DERA%20white%20paper_Regulation%20D_082018.pdf?mod=a
rticle_inline. 
27 See infra Section II.A. 
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growth would have occurred in the private market.28 Venture capitalists now refer 
to the mega-rounds of financings in late-stage startups as “private-IPOs.”29 
Marketplaces for trading private company stock have become part of the 
ecosystem.30 The rise of the private market has consequently sharpened scholarly 
and regulatory focus on the health of the public market and democratizing retail 
investors’ opportunities to fund high-risk and potentially high-growth private 
companies.31  
As the SEC considers dramatically expanding Main Street investor access to 
private investments,32 this Article argues that it is time to examine in-depth the issue 
of securities fraud in private companies. Federal securities law and doctrine has 
oriented our system around a public-private divide with private class actions serving 
as the driving force in securities fraud enforcement—but only against public 
companies.33 Due to a variety of obstacles and economic realities, securities fraud 
class actions have been absent in the private market.34 Although public enforcement 
plays an important role in policing securities fraud, there is no sign that it has kept 
pace with recent developments. Meanwhile, significant information asymmetries 
characterize stock issuances and trading in the private market, as well as the kind of 	
28 Mark Suster & Chang Xu, Is VC Still A Thing?, UPFRONT VENTURES (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://www.slideshare.net/msuster/is-vc-still-a-thing-final. 
29 Id. 
30 See infra Section II.A. 
31 See, e.g., DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL 
STREET AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 165 (2016) (“Also alarming for the 
SEC is whether economic forces are leading to an eclipse of the public corporation, so that 
public equity gradually becomes less available as an investment opportunity.”); Usha Rodrigues, 
Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3389-90 (2013) (arguing for general 
public participation in the private market via mutual fund investment because inequality of 
investor access “lets the rich get richer, while the poor get left behind” ); Jeff Schwartz, Should 
Mutual Funds Invest in Startups? A Case Study of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s Investments in Unicorns (And 
Other Startups) and the Regulatory Implications, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1341 (2017) (arguing “that the 
[mutual funds’] new interest in venture investing poses several potential investor-protection 
concerns”). 
32 See Press Release 2019-97, SEC Seeks Public Comment on Ways to Harmonize Private Securities 
Offering Exemptions (June 18, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-97 (stating 
the SEC is considering whether to allow retail investors greater exposure to growth-stage 
companies and whether to revise the limitations on who can invest in exempt offerings); Jay 
Clayton, SEC Chairman, Testimony on “Oversight of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission,” U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Dec. 10, 2019,  
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clayton%20Testimony%2012-10-191.pdf 
(noting the SEC has an “obligation to explore whether we can increase opportunities for Main 
Street investors in the private markets while maintaining strong and appropriate investor 
protections”); see also Tara Siegel Bernard, Opening the Door to Unicorns Invites Risk for Average 
Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/04/your-
money/investing-private-market-startups.html (noting the SEC granted certain individuals in 
the investment sector access to the private markets even though not meeting accredited investor 
status and expects to further open access to private markets in the future). 
33 See infra Section I.B. 
34 See infra Section II.C. 
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pressure, opportunity, and rationalizing culture that can foster misconduct and 
deception.35 
Given the great potential for harm, particularly to unsophisticated shareholders 
and other stakeholders, as well as the importance of deterring fraud to ensure 
efficient capital allocation, this Article further argues that a response is due. The 
path forward should aim to protect the integrity of the private market and those 
affected by securities fraud, while carefully avoiding chilling the flow of funding for 
innovation and new business.  
Increasing public enforcement presents such a solution. It is not sensitive to 
the issues that impede private class actions in this context such as opaque stock 
pricing, judgment-proof defendants, and the difficulty of aggregating plaintiffs who 
might be differently situated and lack standing or incentive to bring suit. Moreover, 
public enforcement can help to fill the oversight gap that venture capitalists and 
other private investors might leave unfulfilled and can be calibrated over time and 
with further study.  
Finally, the Article explores two additional responses to securities fraud in the 
private market—one bold and one unconventional—both reinforcing the argument 
for increasing public enforcement and presenting opportunity for future regulatory 
change. First, the Article contributes to a growing literature that imagines redrawing 
the public-private line to better capture the public footprint of large corporations 
and possible gradations or tiers of publicness.36 To date this literature has focused 
primarily on the need for the sunlight of public disclosure—by contrast, this Article 
contributes the securities fraud piece of the argument, rooted in our federal 
framework that envisioned both as key mechanisms for the protection of investors 
and the general public. Second, this Article highlights that the response to securities 
fraud need not look the same in the private as in the public market. Alternative 
mechanisms to increase accountability such as giving startup employees additional 
information and empowering gatekeepers to play a stronger role in monitoring 
could provide finely-tuned responses to information problems that could 
supplement increased public enforcement.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I traces the development of Rule 10b-5 
securities fraud in a public market paradigm. Part II describes the growth of the 
private capital market, including discussion of both primary issuances and 
secondary trading. Further, the Part examines governance and cultural factors that 
give rise to factors that are characteristic of securities fraud and analyzes the 
obstacles to Rule 10b-5 class actions in private markets. Together, the picture that 
emerges is a large private capital market in which there is significant potential for 
securities fraud and less scrutiny and enforcement than in the public counterpart. 
Part III explores a variety of responses that provide a foundation for the future of 
policing securities fraud in private markets. 
 
 	
35 See infra Section II.B. 
36 See infra Section III.C. 
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I. The Development of Rule 10b-5 in a Public Market Paradigm 
 
Although the federal securities fraud prohibition broadly applies to both public 
and private companies, litigation and enforcement regarding the former has 
dwarfed the latter. The story of Rule 10b-5 has been told many times, but what has 
not been the focus of the tale is the distinctly public lens through which the 
jurisprudence and practice has developed. Over time, securities fraud jurisprudence 
and academic debate has become increasingly robust, as the paucity of attention to 
private markets has grown more glaring.  
This Part demonstrates the public-company focus through which Rule 10b-5 
jurisprudence and practice has evolved over time, growing into the modern 
landscape in which companies in the public capital market are subject to active 
scrutiny whereas those in the private capital market are often left in the shadows of 
enforcement. 
 
A. Origins  
 
The Great Crash of 1929 set in motion the adoption of the federal securities 
laws that remain our foundational regulatory framework today. At the time of 
passage, there was “widespread consensus that excessive stock market speculation 
and the collapse of the stock market had brought down the economy.”37 The 
securities acts that Congress passed in the Great Depression that followed “were 
primarily concerned with preventing a recurrence.”38 Together, the two key 
securities acts put in place a system of mandatory public disclosure and sanctions 
for disclosure violations and fraud.39  
First, after a series of hearings that revealed shocking financial abuses,40 
Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act) to “provide investors 
with full disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities 
in commerce, to protect investors against fraud and, … to promote ethical 
standards of honesty and fair dealing.”41 The 1933 Act replaced the existing caveat 	
37 Thel, supra note 22, at 409. 
38 Id. 
39 See, e.g., LOSS ET AL., supra note 21; Velikonja, supra note 13, at 1897 (“Modern American 
securities regulation has two prongs: regulation of securities markets and the securities industry; 
and regulation of corporate issuers, including mandatory disclosure, the prohibition of fraud, 
and, more recently, corporate governance.”).  
40 See generally MICHAEL PERINO, THE HELLHOUND OF WALL STREET: HOW FERDINAND 
PECORA’S INVESTIGATION OF THE GREAT CRASH FOREVER CHANGED AMERICAN FINANCE 
(2010) (discussing the Pecora hearings that brought to light a freewheeling banking industry in 
which officials had sold worthless bonds, manipulated stock prices, and garnered excessive 
compensation and bonuses); see also Thel, supra note 22, at 394-424 (discussing the historical 
background of the 1934 Act); LOSS ET AL., supra note 21, at 254-57, 300-305 (describing the 
events of 1929-1933). 
41 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). Section 17(a) is similar in many 
respects to Rule 10b-5 but is broader in that claims under Section 17(a)(2) and (a)(3) may be 
based on negligent conduct, and narrower in that it does not reach the “purchase” of securities 
	 10	
emptor philosophy with one of issuer disclosure.42 Further, the 1933 Act includes 
section 17(a), prohibiting fraud and misrepresentations in the offer or sale of 
securities.43  
Second, in light of the apparent need for additional regulation beyond primary 
securities offerings from issuers, Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (the 1934 Act), which provides for periodic reporting requirements and a 
broad catch-all prohibition against securities fraud in section 10(b).44 This provision 
makes it unlawful to “use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” that contravenes 
any rule promulgated by the SEC.45 As others have observed, “[t]he mandatory 
corporate disclosure system was adopted because of widely held beliefs that 
securities fraud was prevalent and that state laws often could do little to prevent or 
punish it.”46 Section 10(b) closed a loophole in the SEC’s fraud enforcement 
authority by allowing the agency to pursue fraud committed in connection with the 
purchase as well as the sale of securities.47 
In an oft-recounted anecdote, a staff attorney described how the SEC’s rule was 
created several years later, in 1942, in response to a specific incident of fraud—an 
executive was buying up stock in his own company, telling shareholders that the 
company was doing very badly, while knowing that earnings would in fact quadruple 	
or allow for private rights of action. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-71 
(1979); Finkel v. Stratton Corp., 962 F.2d 169, 174-75 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing difference 
between Section 17 and Rule 10b-5); Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(Section 17 actions can be brought in civil regulatory actions by the SEC and criminal 
prosecutions by the DOJ, but not plaintiffs in private lawsuits); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 
401 F.2d 833, 859 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting Section 10(b) was intended as a broad “catch-all” 
enforcement provision aimed at both buyers and sellers of securities). 
42 Thel, supra note 22, at 409. For a discussion of the purposes served by accurate stock prices, 
see Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977 
(1992). 
43 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa. 
44 See LOSS ET AL., supra note 21, at 263-66, 328-30 (describing the perceived need for the 1934 
Act and its main provisions) (“The 1934 Act, as initially enacted, had four basic purposes: to 
afford a measure of disclosure to people who buy and sell securities; to prevent and afford 
remedies for fraud in securities trading and manipulation of the markets; to regulate the 
securities markets; and to control the amount of the Nation’s credit that goes into those 
markets.”); see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 859 (2d Cir. 1968) (“Indeed, 
from its very inception, Section 10(b), and the proposed sections in H.R. 1383 and S. 3420 from 
which it was derived, have always been acknowledged as catchalls.”). 
45 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
46 See LOSS ET AL., supra note 21, at 290-91, 298 (“By the end of the 1917-1920 securities fraud 
wave, it was obvious that state blue sky enforcement alone could have only limited success in 
staunching securities fraud, primarily because no state’s law could reach by direct action or 
extradition a seller of fraudulent securities residing in a second state.”).  
47 Amanda Marie Rose, The Shifting Raison D’Être of the Rule 10b-5 Private Right of Action, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 39, 40 (Sean 
Griffith, Jessica Erickson, David H. Webber & Verity Winship eds., 2018) (citing Exchange Act 
Release No. 3230, 7 Fed. Reg. 3804, 3804 (May 21, 1942)). 
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in the coming year.48 Upon learning of this incident, the staff attorney and a SEC 
director promptly drafted a rule, combining language from section 17 of the 1933 
Act and the congressional grant of authority from section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.49  
In relevant part, Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for any person “to make any 
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.”50 As the telling goes, upon submitting the draft language to the 
commissioners, they passed it around the table and immediately approved it without 
controversy.51 The only comment made was by Commissioner Sumner Pike who 
said, “Well. . . we are against fraud, aren’t we?”52  
Shortly after Rule 10b-5’s adoption, federal courts recognized a private right to 
sue for securities fraud, and, as consensus was forming, the Supreme Court affirmed 
this implied right.53 Early cases brought under Rule 10b-5 resembled common law 
fraud claims, both with respect to the elements and the factual allegations.54 
Plaintiffs were required to prove actual reliance on a defendant’s misrepresentations 
and typical cases involved face-to-face dealings and privity of contract.55 
 
B. Evolution  
 
By the 1960s, two developments began to take root that would ultimately shape 
our modern landscape: the drawing of the public-private line between corporations 	
48 Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 767 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
49 Id. 
50 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. The Supreme Court has established a private cause of action to require 
“(1) a material misrepresentation (or omission); (2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind; (3) a 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; and (5) loss 
causation, i.e., a causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss.” Buell, 
supra note 20, at 545 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).  
51 Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 767 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
52 Id. 
53 Kardon v. Natl. Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (1946) (first recognizing a private right 
of action under Rule 10b-5); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 
13, n.9 (1971) (affirming federal district courts in recognizing private right of action under Rule 
10b-5); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-88 (2001) (discussing evolution of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence on implied private rights of action); Rose, supra note 47, at 40 (discussing 
the development of the private right of action under Rule 10b-5 and the consensus developed 
by the federal courts leading up to Supreme Court recognition). 
54 Rose, supra note 47, at 40-41. 
55 Id. (noting that in the early years of securities fraud jurisprudence “there was little difference 
between Rule 1b-5 and common law fraud claims”); Donald C. Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge 
Carefully: A Duty-Based Approach to Reliance and Third-Party Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2125, 2149 (2010) (noting that before the Second Circuit’s Texas Gulf Sulphur decision in 
1968, “[p]rivate securities fraud litigation had arisen mainly in face-to-face dealings, with fraud 
by a purchaser or seller of securities and with the victims as the counterparties in the 
transaction.”); 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 4.2 (1975) (“The archetypal 10b-5 
case is the purchase by one group in a closed corporation of the interest of another . . .”). 
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and the emergence of the “fraud-on-the-market” class action that pervades modern 
Rule 10b-5 litigation. These regulatory and doctrinal developments converged to 
create a world in which securities fraud litigation is largely enforced by private class 
actions aimed at public company defendants. 
Regarding the first development, both securities acts reflect a public-private 
divide, taking different approaches but together creating a public realm.56 The 1933 
Act governs “public offerings,” but does not define the term.57 An early SEC release 
provided guidance for exempt transactions, noting as relevant factors various 
indicia of a small offering size and close relationship between the issuer and 
offerees.58 In 1953, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in SEC v. Ralston 
Purina Co., ruling that offerees who could “fend for themselves” did not need the 
protections of the Act.59 This interpretation focused the 1933 Act’s public-private 
line on notions of qualification for private investments based on investor wealth 
and sophistication.60  
By contrast, the 1934 Act tied the periodic public disclosure obligations to 
voluntarily listing on a national securities exchange,61 and was amended in 1964 to 
add section 12(g), which set a threshold for public status based on features of the 
issuer company—assets and number of shareholders of record.62 The effect of 
section 12(g) was to bring over-the-counter securities trading, with “sufficiently 
active trading markets and public interest,” within the purview of the SEC’s public 	
56 A.C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in Securities” Revisited: Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private 
Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 999, 1000-1001 (2013) (noting a “mismatch” 
between the 1933 Act’s focus on investor protection through the registration model and the 
1934 Act’s approach which reflects a compromise between investor protection and capital 
formation); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness in Contemporary Securities 
Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 339-40 (noting the “gross inconsistency” in how 
the securities acts approach the public-private divide). 
57 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (stating the Section 5 registration requirement shall not apply to 
“transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering”); Langevoort & Thompson, supra 
note 56, at 343, n.14 (noting the intrastate exemption and exemptions for small dollar offerings). 
58 See Exchange Act Release No. 285, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952 (Jan. 24, 1935) (noting number of 
offerees, relationship to each other and issuer, size and manner of offering as relevant factors). 
59 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). 
60 Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 56, at 340; see also C. Edward Fletcher III, Sophisticated 
Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081 (1988) (examining treatment of 
investor sophistication). 
61 Id. at 344; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78n(a) (1934). 
62 Richard M. Phillips & Morgan Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 
1964 DUKE L.J. 706 (1964); see also Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 56, at 345 (noting the 
lack of theoretical consensus on how to define publicness for purposes of section 12(g) at the 
time of adoption); LOSS ET AL., supra note 39, at 307 (“Elaborate studies of the omission of 
material investment information by firms not subject to the mandatory disclosure system were 
made by the SEC between 1946 and 1963 as part of the Commission’s ultimately successful 
effort to persuade Congress to extend the continuous disclosure provisions of the Securities 
Exchange Act to all firms above a minimum size.”); Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the 
JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the Rules that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. 
L.J. 151, 166-68 (2013) (discussing congressional debate of the 1964 amendments).  
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disclosure regime.63 Thus, by the 1960s there were three triggers for public status—
making a “public offering,” listing on a national securities exchange, and reaching 
the section 12(g) size threshold. As Donald Langevoort and Robert Thompson 
have observed: “For a time, at least, the 1964 amendments created a strong bias in 
favor of public status, precisely given the practical needs of most growing 
businesses for both capital and liquidity.”64  
The second development that began during this period was a doctrinal shift to 
“unmoor” the private Rule 10b-5 cause of action “from its common law roots.”65 
As a result of a series of rulings, the “fraud-on-the-market” class action emerged 
and became the dominant force of modern securities fraud litigation. 
 An early step on this path was the abandonment of privity as a requirement for 
liability. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the Second Circuit held that a defendant 
need not be either a counterparty nor a contemporaneous trader to violate section 
10(b) or Rule 10b-5.66 The requirement that the fraud be “in connection with the 
purchase or sale of [a] security” was met by victims who were purchasers or sellers; 
the violator could be anyone who made a material misrepresentation or omission 
in a manner “reasonably calculated to influence the investing public.”67 
Subsequently, investors began filing actions that became known as “fraud-on-the-
market” cases, claiming the marketplace had been deceived by false 
representations.68 Furthermore, 1966 revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure enabled plaintiffs to aggregate claims in an opt-out class action under 
Rule 23(b)(3), provided common issues predominate over individualized ones.69 
The next important doctrinal development was the Supreme Court’s 
recognition in Basic v. Levinson of a presumption of reliance in private Rule 10b-5 
cases involving securities widely traded in “efficient” markets.70	 Plaintiffs are 
entitled to this rebuttable presumption of reliance if they show that the alleged 
misrepresentation was material and public, the stock traded in an efficient market, 
and their trading occurred between the time the misrepresentation was made and 
when the truth was revealed.71 The fraud-on-the-market theory was based on the 	
63 Reporting by Small Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 23,407, 1986 WL 703825 at *2 (July 8, 
1986); Usha Rodrigues, The Once and Future Irrelevancy of Section 12(g), 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1529, 
1534 (2015) (discussing the origins of section 12(g) of the 1934 Act). 
64 Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 56, at 346. 
65 Rose, supra note 47, at 39.  
66 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). 
67 Id. at 862. 
68 Langevoort, supra note 55, at 2149. 
69 Rose, supra note 47, at 45.  
70 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 
2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 158-62. Prior to this decision, the Supreme Court had dispensed with 
the requirement of reliance in material omission cases. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 
406 U.S. 128 (1972). For a critical examination of the weaknesses of the efficient market theory, 
see Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities 
Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An 
Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003). 
71 Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-47. 
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efficient capital market hypothesis, which maintained that “the market price of 
shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information, 
and, hence, any material misrepresentations.”72 Thus, Basic freed public company 
shareholders from showing that they actually relied on the alleged 
misrepresentation. Instead, such plaintiffs have a presumption that they relied on 
the integrity of the stock’s market price.73 
Together, the abandonment of the privity requirement and the acceptance of 
the fraud-on-the-market theory transformed Rule 10b-5 litigation. Corporations 
that had not bought or sold stock could be defendants, despite being neither 
counterparty nor contemporaneous trader. Eliminating the requirement to prove 
individualized reliance expanded the universe of potential plaintiffs and facilitated 
class actions.74 These class actions grew to predominate securities fraud litigation 
and dramatically departed from earlier case law and traditional common law fraud 
cases.75 With compensatory damages available in Rule 10b-5 class actions, such that 
plaintiffs can recover their full out-of-pocket losses attributable to the fraud, 
attorneys have strong incentive to bring these suits against public company 
defendants.76 	
72 Id. at 246. Economists developed the efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH) in the mid-
1960s as a way to explain several empirical studies that found future changes in stock prices were 
a “random walk” that could not be accurately predicted based on prior prices. The ECMH 
“explains” the random walk by hypothesizing that price changes in response to information 
about a particular company’s stock. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of 
Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) (reviewing economics literature on the ECMH); 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the 
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 (1994) (summarizing the history 
of the ECMH and the random walk model of public capital market behavior); see also Ronald J. 
Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 609 
(1984) (observing “relative efficiency is a function of information costs”). 
73 Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Halliburton Co. 
v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258 (2014), which re-affirmed the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption, see Allen Ferrell & Andrew Roper, Price Impact, Materiality, and Halliburton II, 93 
WASH. U. L. REV. 554 (2015). 
74 Rose, supra note 47, at 45-46. 
75 Id. (noting that modern fraud-on-the-market class actions not only involve an “expanded set 
of plaintiffs and defendants, an altered set of elements, and the aggregation of claims,” but also 
“involve defendants with different motives, raise different stakes, and create different incentives 
to sue and settle than existed in the early years of 10b-5 enforcement”). 
76 Securities fraud class actions against public companies exploded by the 1990s, prompting 
regulation attempting to re-calibrate the level of private litigation. See Buell, supra note 20, at 550 
(“Seeking to reduce the expenses arising out of weak or meritless cases, Congress updated the 
‘34 Act with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). Under the PSLRA, 
private plaintiffs must satisfy a heightened pleading standard with respect to the element of 
scienter.”); A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as 
Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 927-28 (1999) (noting “the damages recoverable in 
such suits can be a substantial percentage of the corporation’s total capitalization, reaching the 
tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars” and that corporations’ complaints about their 
prevalence led to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995). 
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Indeed, Rule 10b-5 as a tool against securities fraud has been undeniably shaped 
by the public company paradigm that envisions class action attorneys serving as 
private monitors of public disclosures affecting stock prices on an efficient 
market.77 From the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance to “materiality” 
defined in terms of a “reasonable investor,” the very elements of a 10b-5 suit reflect 
the prevalence of public company cases.78  
And although courts certainly have not required the markers of the public 
company paradigm for a securities fraud action,79 the availability of stock price 
movements on a public market facilitates discovery of suits and the prospect of 
large compensatory damages incentivizes such monitoring.80 In 2018, 374 of the 
403 securities class actions involved public companies with stock traded on the New 
York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq.81 The trend is toward larger company 
defendants—those involved in cases settled in 2018 were approximately 50 percent 
larger than those in the previous year, as measured by median total assets—seventy-
eight securities class actions against public companies settled for over $5 billion in 
total.82 As the next Part explains, while these settlement amounts and corporate 
defendants are large, the doctrinal evolution of securities litigation toward a public 	
77 See Buell, supra note 20, at 550 (“the class action dominates the modern industry of private 
securities litigation”).  
78 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 38 (2011) (discussing “materiality”); No. 
84 Employer-Teamster JT Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. West Holding Co., 320 F.3d 920, 
950 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that when a public company corrects an alleged omission or 
misrepresentation, the stock price movement or lack of movement is “at least telling of what a 
reasonable investor would consider significant”); In re Pfizer, Inc. Sec. Litig., 538 F. Supp. 2d 
621 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that in an efficient market, the “total mix of information” is 
understood as the information available to the public market); see also DONNA M. NAGY, 
RICHARD W. PAINTER & MARGARET V. SACHS, SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 65 (2012) (noting courts have allowed the market itself to stand-in for 
the reasonable investor when securities are traded in an “efficient” market). 
79 To be sure, on the government side, the SEC and DOJ also play a critical role in enforcement 
and can go after the full spectrum of public and private companies. See James J. Park, Rules, 
Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115, 145-62 (2012) 
(discussing securities fraud enforcement by the SEC, federal prosecutors, state attorneys general, 
and private class action attorneys); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 
(2007) (noting that private actions are an “essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and 
civil enforcement actions brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC)”). 
80 Notably, plaintiffs’ attorneys not only use stock price drops as a mechanism for detecting 
potential class action suits, but also for proving the element of loss causation. See Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 344-46 (2005) (finding that loss causation can be 
established by showing that public disclosure of a fact was followed by a stock price decline); see 
also Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 548 (2012) 
(observing that “for public firms, share-price drops can trigger class action lawsuits alleging that 
glowing public disclosures released prior to a collapse were fraudulent”). 
81 See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2018 REVIEW AND 
ANALYSIS 1, 46 (2019), http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2018/Securities-
Class-Action-Settlements-2018-Review-and-Analysis.pdf. 
82 Id.  
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company model significantly narrows the realm of capital markets being actively 
monitored once one takes into account the rise of the private capital market. 
 
II. The Growth of Private Markets and the Potential for Private Company 
Lies  
 
The era of one dominant capital market in the United States is over.83 The 
public capital market remains profoundly important to the economy, but it now sits 
in tension with a rising private capital market that is “both unrivaled and coveted 
around the globe” for “substantially contribut[ing] to the competitiveness of U.S. 
firms.”84  
Research indicates that private equity and venture capital investments have 
grown at twice the rate of their public counterparts in recent years.85 Venture-
backed startups are staying private longer on average and reaching record-breaking 
private valuations in the billions of dollars, rivaling or surpassing public industrial 
giants in some cases.86 Private company returns have also outperformed public 
market-growth—global private equity net asset value grew by 18% in 2018, and 
overall it has grown by 7.5 times in the twenty-first century—twice as fast as public-
market capitalization.87 
The rising private capital market not only delivers growth and innovation that 
is the envy of the world, however—it also poses enormous new challenges and 
concerns that policymakers, academics, and market participants have only begun to 
address. For its part, the SEC has announced twin goals of increasing the 
attractiveness of public capital markets while also expanding Main Street investors’ 	
83 See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Paradigm Shift: Federal Securities Regulation in the New Millennium, 2 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 339,  341-53 (2008) (describing “the global proliferation of 
viable private and public markets, the trend of investment intermediation and deretailization, 
and the accelerated pace of financial innovation”); Amy Deen Westbrook & David A. 
Westbrook, Unicorns, Guardians, and the Concentration of the U.S. Equity Markets, 96 NEB. L. REV. 
688, 716-27 (2017) (discussing the rise of the private equity market and the relative decline of 
the IPO market). 
84 Chairman Jay Clayton, Remarks to the Economic Club of New York, Sept. 9, 2019, 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-clayton-2019-09-09 [hereinafter Clayton, 2019 
Remarks]. 
85 Id.; see also McKinsey, McKinsey’s Private Markets Annual Review, February 2019, 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/private-equity-and-principal-investors/our-
insights/mckinseys-private-markets-annual-review (noting that $778 billion of new capital 
flowed into the private capital market in 2018). 
86 Clayton, 2019 Remarks, supra note 84; NVCA 2019 Yearbook, https://nvca.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/08/NVCA-2019-Yearbook.pdf; Jay R. Ritter, Initial Public Offerings: 
Updated Statistics (Dec. 31, 2018), 
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2019/01/IPOs2018Statistics_Dec.pdf. For a 
discussion of venture-backed company valuations, see Will Gornall & Ilya A. Strebulaev, 
Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with Reality, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2955455 (forthcoming J. FIN. ECON.). 
87 McKinsey, supra note 85. 
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access to private investments.88 This policy stance reflects the bind that the agency 
finds itself in—troubled by declining numbers of public companies trading on 
national securities exchanges, yet also cognizant that Main Street investors may be 
shut out of the private capital market where much of the growth phase of 
companies’ development is occurring. While the SEC prioritizes opening up access 
to the private capital market, little debate has focused on the potential for harm 
through securities fraud in this increasingly large section of the overall capital 
markets.  
This Part examines the rise and growth of the private capital market, 
highlighting the changes that have occurred that have enabled this development and 
the features of this market and its participants. Notably, the universe of private 
companies is wide and encompasses closely-held corporations such as the 
paradigmatic family business, private equity-backed companies in which a small 
number of institutional investors are actively involved in management, and venture 
capital-backed startups aimed at high growth and exit.89 While securities fraud can 
occur in all of these types of private companies, the latter category poses particular 
concern as venture capital has soared to record levels while operating on a business 
model known to push for growth at all costs, aiming for a few homeruns and writing 
off failures.90 This Part therefore gives special attention to exploring the 
information asymmetries, pressure for growth, and freewheeling culture in startups 
that give rise to the potential for securities fraud that could significantly impact 
investors and stakeholders. Finally, it examines the obstacles for traditional 
securities class actions to play a monitoring role in the private capital market. 
 
A. The New Private Landscape 
 
In a recent speech, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton acknowledged: “We now have 
two segments in our capital markets. . . Twenty-five years ago, the public markets 
dominated the private markets in virtually every measure. Today, in many measures, 
the private markets outpace the public markets, including in aggregate size.”91 The 
SEC’s analysis estimates that registered public offerings accounted for $1.4 trillion 
of new capital in 2018 compared to approximately $2.9 trillion raised through 
exempt private offerings.92 Public companies have declined in number by nearly 	
88 Clayton, 2019 Remarks, supra note 84. 
89 Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 163-65 (2019). 
90 See Erin Griffith, The Ugly Unethical Underside of Silicon Valley, FORTUNE (Dec. 28, 2016), 
https://fortune.com/longform/silicon-valley-startups-fraud-venture-capital/ (“Faking it, from 
marketing exaggerations to outright fraud, feels more prevalent than ever—so much so that it’s 
time to ask whether startup culture itself is becoming a problem.”); see also 16 of the Biggest Alleged 
Startup Frauds of All Time, CB INSIGHTS (May 23, 2019), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/biggest-startup-frauds/ (“There’s almost always an 
element of ‘fake it ‘till you make it’ for a successful, disruptive startup. Some companies just 
push their luck a little too far.”). 
91 Id. 
92 Id.  
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half in the past two decades and they are significantly larger on average.93 These 
figures reflect the dramatic transformation of U.S. markets in the twenty-first 
century. 
Venture-backed startups constitute a large portion of the private capital market 
and their lifecycle has changed significantly. The venture capital (VC) life cycle starts 
with the creation of funds that raise capital from institutional and accredited 
investors interested in private growth assets.94 The VC deploys the funds into a 
portfolio of startup companies, typically also playing a role in governance or 
otherwise supporting these innovative companies.95 VC funds generally have a 
defined term of ten years and detailed rules about how limited partner investors can 
liquidate their assets at the end of that period.96 The goal is for the startup 
companies in the portfolio to grow quickly and achieve successful “exits” during 
this period through an M&A sale or IPO that makes a significant return on 
investment.97 While M&A exits are more common, industry experts and academics 
have long viewed IPOs as essential for sustaining a robust venture capital industry 
because they provide a mechanism for obtaining high investor returns and 
liquidity.98 VCs are based on a business model that aims for having a few “home 
runs” that account for much of the fund returns.99 	
93 Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, & René M. Stulz, The U.S. Listing Gap, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 
464, 467 (2017) (“The number of U.S. listings fell from 8.025 in 1996 to 4,101 in 2012, whereas 
non-U.S. listings increased from 30,734 to 39,427.”); Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of 
Private Capital and the Decline of the Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 454 (2017) (“From 2001 
through 2012, there were an average of only 99 IPOs per year, compared to 310 IPOs per year 
between 1980 and 2000.”); Kathleen M. Kahle & René M. Stulz, Is the U.S. Public Corporation in 
Trouble? 2 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 495/2017, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2869301 (“The steady decrease in the 
number of listed firms since 1997 has resulted from both low numbers of newly listed firms and 
high numbers of delists. . . . [T]he average yearly number of IPOs after 2000 is roughly one-
third of the average from 1980 to 2000.”); see also Brian R. Cheffins, Rumours of the Death of the 
American Public Company are Greatly Exaggerated 22-23 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working 
Paper No. 444/2019, 2019) (arguing that based on the “ratio of aggregate market capitalization 
of publicly traded stocks to gross domestic product,” the public company is “currently as 
important relative to the U.S. economy as it ever has been, if not more so.”). 
94 Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2003); PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL 
CYCLE 1-32 (2d ed. 2004). 
95 Gilson, supra note 94, at 1071; Pollman, supra note 89, at 164, 170. 
96 See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: 
Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 248 (1998) (explaining the standard limited 
partnership agreement). 
97 D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 317 (2005). 
98 Black & Gilson, supra note 96, at 245 (arguing that “a well developed stock market that permits 
venture capitalists to exit through an initial public offering (IPO) is critical to the existence of a 
vibrant venture capital market”); Ibrahim, supra note 25, at 11 (“IPOs are the gold standard in 
VC success.”). 
99 See PETER THIEL, ZERO TO ONE: NOTES ON STARTUPS, OR HOW TO BUILD THE FUTURE 86-
87 (2014) (“[T]he best investment in a successful fund equals or outperforms the entire rest of 
the fund combined.”); Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1998, 
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In previous times, a startup company that survived to exit would typically be 
acquired within its first two years or go public within five and a half years on 
average.100 Companies raised capital from public markets to fuel growth and access 
liquidity for VC investors and startup employees who had received stock options.101 
The world’s largest companies by market capitalization—Microsoft, Amazon, 
Apple, and Google—all followed this path as venture-backed startups.102 
But with regulatory changes and an unprecedented influx of private capital, 
companies have increasingly stayed longer in the private market and tend to go to 
the public markets only when governance complexity builds over a decade and 
private investors are ready to cash out.103 One of the most notable regulatory 
changes facilitating staying private longer was the JOBS Act of 2012, in which 
Congress raised the section 12(g) threshold of the 1934 Act from 500 to 2,000 
shareholders of record, of which no more than 499 can be unaccredited investors.104 
Employee stock option holders and shareholders are not counted in this tally—and, 
in 2018, the SEC raised the Rule 701 threshold to require financial disclosures to 
stock option holders only once a company grants more than $10 million in options 
during a twelve-month period.105  	
at 131, 136 (“Given the portfolio approach and the deal structure VCs use, only 10% to 20% of 
the companies funded need to be real winners to achieve the targeted return rate . . . . In fact, 
VC reputations are often built on one or two good investments.”).  
100 Joseph Ghalbouni & Dominique Rouziès, The VC Shakeout, HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 
2010, at 21, 22; NVCA 2019 Yearbook, supra note 86. 
101 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 97, at 352 (“The primary justification for an IPO is to raise money, 
usually in anticipation of a substantial expansion in the company’s operations, but the IPO has 
many ancillary benefits. In addition, to the obvious benefits that accompany the liquidity of 
public capital markets, companies may find that publicly traded stock is useful in recruiting new 
managers and acquiring other companies.”). 
102 Pollman, supra note 89; Stephen Grocer, Biggest Public Company? Microsoft. Wait, Apple Again. 
Amazon? No, Back to Microsoft., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2019/02/05/business/dealbook/apple-amazon-microsoft-marketvalue.html. 
Google had been profitable pre-IPO and was able to finance its operations but hit up against 
the section 12(g) threshold of 500 shareholders of record and thus decided to file for an IPO. 
See Rodrigues, supra note 63, at 1537. 
103 See Pollman, supra note 89, at 209-16. Bloomberg columnist Matt Levine has referred to this 
phenomenon with the pithy phrase, “private markets are the new public markets.” Matt Levine, 
Something Is Lost When Companies Stay Private, BLOOMBERG (April 3, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-04/something-is-lost-when-
companies-stay-private (“Private markets are the new public markets. That’s a thing that I say a 
lot . . . You stay private to raise money and build your business and grow; you go public to allow 
your investors to cash out.”). 
104 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 
306, 325 (2012). For a discussion of agency capture and public choice theory with regard to the 
JOBS Act, see Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market, 91 N.C. L. 
REV. 745, 786-96 (2013); Rodrigues, supra note 63, at 1552-54. 
105 Additionally, the SEC shortened the Rule 144 holding period to allow resales of private 
company stock after one year with no conditions, and exempted Rule 506 private placements 
with accredited investors from the ban on general solicitation. See Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn 
	 20	
The upshot of these changes is that significant amounts of capital are tied up 
for long periods in essentially illiquid or semi-illiquid markets with little 
transparency. The average time to M&A and IPO exits have nearly tripled since the 
late 1990s and, as noted, fewer companies have gone public.106 Going public has 
become a choice rather than an inevitability even for large corporations as the 
section 12(g) threshold no longer “forces” any companies over the line.107 The limit 
of 2,000 shareholders of record is sufficiently high that a shareholder base can be 
managed to stay below it—particularly as “special purpose vehicles” (SPVs) and 
other planning tools are used to aggregate holdings.108  
Companies tend to be larger when they enter the public market, with more of 
their growth trajectory in their past as a private company. With record-breaking 
amounts of private capital available, and a competitive market to invest in the most 
buzzworthy startups, private valuations have been high—leading to speculation of 
a tech bubble and “overpriced” IPOs.109  
A greater diversity of investors has also entered the private markets. Whereas 
in the past, startups were typically funded by family and friends, angel investors, and 
venture capitalists, in recent years these investors have been joined by family offices, 
hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds, and sovereign wealth funds.110 These 
newcomers expose retail investors to the private markets and, as institutional 	
Governance Trap,  166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 165, 175-76 (2017) (discussing amendments to 
Rules 144 and 506). 
106 NVCA 2019 Yearbook, supra note 86; Ritter, supra note 86. 
107 See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Questioning the 500 Equity Holders Trigger, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
ONLINE 43, 45 (2011) (explaining that the practical effect of the previous threshold was “to 
force certain types of firms into public markets”); cf. Rodrigues, supra note 63, at 1530 (finding 
that the previous threshold of 500 shareholders of record may have affected only three percent 
of those going public). 
108 See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 56, at 355-59 (discussing the “record ownership” 
and the SEC’s anticircumvention rule, Rule 12g5-1, in the private company context); Douglas 
MacMillan, In Silicon Valley Frenzy, VCs Create New Inside Track, WALL ST. J. (April 2, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-silicon-valley-frenzy-vcs-create-new-inside-track-
1427992176 (discussing the increasing use of special purpose vehicles to invest in venture-
backed startups); Alistair Barr, One Theory Why Lyft, Uber IPOs Flopped: Special Purpose Vehicles, 
BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-17/one-
theory-why-lyft-uber-ipos-flopped-special-purpose-vehicles (“SPVs are often set up to invest in 
fast-growing startups, especially those like Uber that stay private for may years.”). 
109 See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 86, at 1 (finding that after adjusting for valuation-inflating 
terms in preferred stock financings, almost half of “unicorns” lose their status as billion-plus 
valued companies); David Trainer, The Unicorn Bubble is Bursting, FORBES (Oct. 7, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2019/10/07/the-unicorn-bubble-is-
bursting/#e3f34f388198 (“There does not appear to be any appreciation for risk of bidding up 
the price of unicorns too high.”); Matt Phillips et al., Wall Street Deflates America’s Favorite Start-
Ups, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/26/business/tech-ipo-
market.html (discussing fear of a bubble and “the verdict from the stock market is that it’s the 
private investment binge that has gone too far”). 
110 Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 86, at 2; Pollman, supra note 89, at 175; Sergey Chernenko, 
Josh Lerner & Yao Zeng, Mutual Funds as Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns, HBS Working 
Paper #18-037 (2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23981.pdf. 
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investors, they are sophisticated but do not have long track records of investing in 
this asset class, the special challenges they pose, and their distinctive style of 
governance and contracting practices.  
These developments have affected both primary issuances and secondary 
trading of private company stock.111 At core, companies staying private longer and 
reaching higher valuations means that there is a greater volume of transactions and 
dollars invested112—and correspondingly more opportunity for securities fraud. In 
addition, the greater diversity of investors in late-stage rounds of financing has 
expanded the universe from the Silicon Valley community of VCs that are repeat 
players in a reputational market to a global mix of institutional investors that 
resembles public markets in some respects. The enormous amount of private capital 
seeking to invest in the best deals, combined with new investors in the space, has 
created leverage for companies to choose which investors to accept and to limit 
disclosures—adding to information asymmetries which can also enable securities 
fraud.  
Primary issuances to investors occur through private placements relying on an 
exemption from registration—typically Regulation D in connection with offers of 
securities to “accredited investors” or Section 4(a)(2) which exempts “transactions 
by an issuer not involving any public offering” as interpreted by the Supreme Court 
in Ralston Purina.113 There are no specific disclosure requirements for private 
placements under Section 4(a)(2) or Regulation D offerings to accredited 
investors114—creating the possibility of negotiations for limited disclosures and 
extreme divergences in the information known about the company.   
Employees generally are not financially sophisticated and typically do not 
qualify as accredited investors who would be permitted to participate in a private 	
111 See James J. Park, Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law, 64 UCLA L. REV. 
116, 144-45 (2017) (“After a security has been distributed to the public, it trades in a secondary 
market. Such transactions involve trading between investors rather than a sale form the issuer 
to an investor.”); Pollman, supra note 23 (discussing secondary trading in private company stock). 
112 For example, a notable recent study of 116 unicorn companies found that the average unicorn 
has eight share classes, indicating many rounds of financings. Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 
86, at 3. 
113 See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (holding application of the exemption 
“should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected need the protection of the 
[Securities] Act. An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a 
transaction ‘not involving any public offering’”); THERESE H. MAYNARD, DANA M. WARREN & 
SHANNON TREVIÑO, BUSINESS PLANNING: FINANCING THE START-UP BUSINESS AND 
VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCING 218-23 (3d ed. 2018) (explaining private placements and 
accredited investor status); James C. Spindler, How Private Is Private Equity, And At What Cost?, 
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 311 (2009) (“The very essence of private equity is exemption from the 
public securities laws: funds make investments in nonpublic portfolio companies, and the funds 
themselves are typically structured as limited partnerships.”). 
114 If non-accredited investors are included in a Regulation D offering, the issuer would have to 
comply with Regulation 502(b) which requires financial statements and other information 
similar to a registration statement for an IPO. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b). For this reason, issuers 
typically structure private placements to include only accredited investors to avoid the 
requirements of Rule 502(b).  
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placement of their employers’ securities. Rule 701 exempts grants of share-based 
compensation to employees.115 Most companies will satisfy the minimal disclosure 
requirement of Rule 701 by merely providing the employee recipients with a copy 
of the relevant stock option plan.116 Companies that issue more than $10 million 
worth of securities under the exemption in a 12-month period are required to 
provide a summary of the material terms of the compensatory plan, a list of risk 
factors associated with investing in the company’s securities, and financial 
statements.117 Scholars have criticized these disclosure requirements as inadequate 
and poorly tailored to employees’ needs, particularly in unicorn companies that have 
reached sizeable valuations and may have large numbers of employees with little 
access to information.118 
While the changing private market landscape has impacted primary issuances, 
the bigger transformation has been the rise of secondary trading in private company 
stock.119 A decade ago, the private secondary market had been notably illiquid and 
ad hoc, with occasional transfers done as carefully negotiated affairs.120 An 
opportunity arose for intermediaries to facilitate such trading, however, with two 
developments—internet platform technology and rule changes that eased resale 
restrictions. Specifically, in 2007 the SEC shortened the holding period for the 
transfer of private company stock to one year with no conditions.121 The agency 
further provided a regulatory exemption for resales to “qualified institutional 
	
115 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (2019).  
116 See id. 
117 Id. 
118 Yifat Aran, Making Disclosure Work for Startup Employees,  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3492151 (forthcoming COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 2019); Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock Option: Golden Goose or Trojan Horse?, 2019 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 107; Abraham J.B. Cable, Fool’s Gold?: Equity Compensation & the Mature Startup, 11 
VA. L. & BUS. REV. 613 (2017); Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private 
Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583 (2016).  
119 Pollman, supra note 23; Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
1 (2012). Earlier periods noted a lack of secondary trading in private company stock as a limiting 
factor on securities fraud litigation. See Steinberg, supra note 23, at 762: “The application of rule 
10b-5 to close corporations, where lawsuits typically relate less directly to the purchase or sale 
of a security, has been a major cause of uncertainty over the rule’s scope. Because there is no 
secondary trading of [private company] securities, the rule 10b-5 close corporation lawsuit is 
more likely to contain corporate law issues.”). 
120 Id. at 203; Brad Stone, Silicon Valley Cashes Out Selling Private Shares, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 21, 2011), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-04-
21/silicon-valley-cashes-out-selling-private-shares. 
121 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2017); see also Pollman, supra note 23, at 193 (noting that “[t]he 
combination of the lengthened period of time companies stay private, securities law exemptions 
for the resale of restricted stock, and information technology” created the opportunity for online 
marketplaces for trading private shares); Jones, supra note 105, at 175 (describing the SEC’s 
series of reforms shortening the Rule 144 holding periods). 
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buyers”—allowing unlimited transactions with no holding period.122 In 2009, two 
platforms, SecondMarket and SharesPost, launched as online intermediaries, taking 
a small fee while reducing the search and transaction costs for secondary trading.123 
With companies staying private longer, and using stock and stock options as 
incentive-based compensation, the possibility for secondary trading to liquidate 
some stock ownership became increasingly important to startup participants. 
Employees, former employees, angel investors, and VCs used these sites to identify 
accredited buyers willing to buy their private company stock—and quickly the 
platforms were doing large amounts of transactions.124  
In turn, many startups responded by putting in place contractual trading 
restrictions on their stock in order to manage their shareholder base and valuation 
and information issues that arise with an active secondary trading market for private 
company stock.125 The SecondMarket business model evolved to work with 
companies to facilitate liquidity events such as share buybacks and third-party 
tender offers, rather than functioning as online auctions or bulletin boards for 
connecting buyers and sellers.126 In 2014, Nasdaq launched a private market 
initiative as a competitor and by the following year had acquired SecondMarket and 
repositioned itself as the private parallel to its public exchange counterpart.127 It 
works with companies to facilitate “structured sales programs” that allow a 
company to impose guidelines, limitations, or restrictions around the sale of 
stock.128  
The rest of the secondary market evolved as well. SharesPost continues to 
function as an over-the-counter marketplace and has added an offering to invest in 
late-stage venture-backed companies through a proprietary closed-end interval 	
122 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2017). Qualified institutional buyers are companies that invest at least 
$100 million in securities of non-affiliated issuers and registered broker-dealers with over $100 
million in assets. Id. § 230.144A(a). 
123 Pollman, supra note 23. 
124  See Evelyn M. Rusli & Peter Lattman, Losing a Goose That Laid the Golden Egg, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Feb. 2, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/02/losing-the-goose-that-
laid-the-golden-egg/ (noting SharesPost facilitated $625 million in transactions in 2011, 
SecondMarket almost $600 million, with pre-IPO Facebook stock constituting about a third of 
the trading volume). 
125 Pollman, supra note 23, at 205-21 (discussing information issues in secondary trading of 
private company stock and the potential for insider trading); Rodrigues, supra note 63, at 1539 
(“Because these transactions took place not on a public exchange like the NYSE, but instead in 
a private market limited to accredited investors, they could transpire outside the reach of the 
SEC’s 1999 rule on OTC trading. No disclosure necessary.”). 
126 See Founders Circle Capital, A Brief History of Secondary Stock Sales: From One-Offs to Employee 
Tender Offers, https://www.founderscircle.com/history-of-secondary-sale-shares/. 
127 Nasdaq Private Market Acquires SecondMarket, Nasdaq (Oct. 22, 2015), 
http://ir.nasdaq.com/news-releases/news-release-details/nasdaq-private-market-acquires-
secondmarket; Tess Stynes & Bradley Hope, Nasdaq Acquires SecondMarket, Profit Rises 12%, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nasdaq-acquires-secondmarket-
profit-rises-12-1445511644. 
128 NASDAQ PRIVATE MARKET, https://www.nasdaq.com/solutions/nasdaq-private-market 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2019). 
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fund.129 Additional private-company marketplaces arose such as Equidate and 
EquityZen, each with their variations on facilitating private company secondary 
deals and liquidity for private company employees.130  
Finally, the level of secondary activity and complexity of the transactions is 
noteworthy. The overall size of these secondary markets is significant and the trend 
is increasing—over $4 billion in transaction volume was executed in 2017 by the 
four main players.131 In 2018, Nasdaq Private Market alone did $12 billion in 
transaction volume and saw a significant increase in the number of third-party 
tender offers.132 Moreover, the combinations of company buybacks, third-party 
tender offers, and intermediated purchases such as through SPVs has grown, 
resulting in new norms as well as different information flows and pricing.133 For 
example, late-stage startups commonly plan a primary issuance in a financing round 
to be timed with a secondary market liquidity program for selected employees.134 
Companies are often therefore simultaneously negotiating with new investors—
disclosing limited information and setting prices—and buying back employee stock 
or facilitating a third-party buyer to do so.135  	
129 SHARESPOST, Investors FAQs: SharesPost 100 List, 
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131 Id. 
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133 See NASDAQ PRIVATE MARKET, 2019 Mid-Year Private Company Report (July 2019), 
https://www.nasdaq.com/solutions/nasdaq-private-market (describing variety of secondary 
activity in private company stock and growth of transaction volume); Larcker, Tayan & Watts, 
supra note 130, at 2 (describing impact of private marketplaces on companies and employees); 
Dawn Belt, Pre-IPO Liquidity for Late Stage Start-Ups, LEXISNEXIS (2018), 
https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/Pre-IPO-Liquidity-for-Late-Stage-Start-
Up.pdf (discussing secondary sales, company buybacks, and information asymmetry 
considerations); Douglas MacMillan, In Silicon Valley Frenzy, VCs Create New Inside Track, WALL 
ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-silicon-valley-frenzy-vcs-create-new-
inside-track-1427992176 (“[T]hese funds pose financial risks. A venture capitalist gets a detailed 
look into a startup’s revenue, costs and financial projections before they make a decision to 
invest. Buyers of SPVs are usually only offered a high-level view into the potential performance, 
not detailed financial metrics. . .”). 
134 Some investors, such as the Softbank Vision Fund, have simultaneously participated in both 
primary and secondary transactions. See Dana Olsen, Vision Fund 101: Inside SoftBank’s $98B 
Vehicle, PITCHBOOK (Aug. 2, 2017), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/vision-fund-101-
inside-softbanks-93b-vehicle. 
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B. The Potential for Securities Fraud in Private Companies 
 
The private capital market is now characterized by an unprecedented amount 
of money and stock transactions. Given regulatory and contractual restrictions on 
trading, the result is neither a liquid and efficient market nor one completely lacking 
these features.136 In light of the lack of mandated disclosure, however, it is clear that 
far less information is available than in the public context and extreme information 
asymmetries can exist between trading parties. The discussion now turns, therefore, 
to exploring this large and relatively dark market in terms of its potential for 
securities fraud. 
At the outset, it must be acknowledged that it is, quite naturally, impossible to 
know the extent of the problem.137 State enforcement actions provide one 
indication of significance—private offerings have been the most common source 
of such actions.138 And, anecdotally, numerous startup stories have made headlines 
that reveal alleged misconduct that could potentially have touched upon stock 
purchases or sales. In addition to the examples already highlighted, the past few 
years have revealed a host of issues: Lending Club falsified loan transactions and 
failed to disclose the CEO-founder’s conflict of interest;139 human resources startup 
Zenefits admitted that its employees cheated on mandatory compliance training 
central to its business model;140 WrkRiot’s CEO-founder plead guilty to defrauding 	
to differing liquidity expectations of the buyers and sellers, and the subsequent wide spread 
between the bid and ask of these private stock offerings”). 
136 Although different, the public and private markets may act as substitutes for certain purposes. 
See Gubler, supra note 104, at 752 (“The two securities markets—the public and the private—
serve many of the same functions (capital raising, liquidity generation, and price creation) and 
therefore act as substitutes (albeit imperfect ones).”). 
137 See, e.g., Michael D. Guttentag, Protection From What? Investor Protection and the JOBS Act, 13 U.C. 
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 207, 254 (2013) (“The JOBS Act [provisions] will make it possible for many 
more firms to have freely traded securities without any affirmative federal periodic disclosure 
obligations. The impact of this change on the extent to which investors will be harmed by an 
increase in fraudulent activity is uncertain. The main reason for this uncertainty is our limited 
understanding of what causes fraud.”).  
138 Bernard, supra note 32. 
139 Max Chafkin & Noah Buhayar, How Lending Club’s Biggest Fanboy Uncovered Shady Loans, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2016-08-18/how-
lending-club-s-biggest-fanboy-uncovered-shady-loans; Peter Rudegair, Lending Club CEO Fired 
Over Faulty Loans, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lendingclub-ceo-
resigns-over-sales-review-1462795070. 
140 Griffith, supra note 90; Katie Benner & Mike Isaac, Zenefits Compensates Investors Over Past 
Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/technology/zenefits-compensates-investors-over-
past-misconduct.html. In 2017, Zenefits settled SEC charges that it misled investors in private 
offerings by making false statements about the license qualifications of its employees to sell 
insurance. SEC: San Francisco Software Company and Founder Settle Charges of Misleading 
Investors About Business (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-
10429-s.pdf. 
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employees by forging wire-transfer documents;141 Skully’s founders faced a lawsuit 
alleging they engaged in fraudulent bookkeeping and widespread misuse of funds;142 
mobile payments identification company Jumio allegedly overstated its revenues to 
investors before going bankrupt;143 and “sustainable-food” unicorn Hampton 
Creek raised venture capital using sales figures that reflected the company’s practice 
of secretly buying back huge amounts of its own products from supermarket 
shelves.144 
As the potential for securities fraud is thus significant, it is worth exploring the 
factors that might contribute to its prevalence and the differences that exist from 
the public company paradigm. One widely adopted framework, from the 
Association of Certified Fraud examiners, identifies three main factors behind 
workplace fraud: (1) pressure, (2) opportunity, and (3) rationalization.145 Each are 
present in venture-backed startups. 
Pressure. While much is made of the pressure on public company managers in 
light of quarterly earnings and the threat of shareholder activism, such pressure is 
comparable or perhaps even less than commonly experienced by startup managers 
pushed for survival and growth.146  	
141 Jason Green, Silicon Valley Startup Founder Pleads Guilty to Defrauding Employees, MERCURY NEWS 
(Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/02/05/silicon-valley-startup-founder-
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143 The former CEO of Jumio, Daniel Mattes, paid over $17 million to settle SEC charges that 
he defrauded investors.  Lucinda Shen, This Founder Just Agreed to Pay $17 Million to Settle a Fraud 
Charge. Now He’s Heading an A.I. Startup, FORTUNE (Apr. 3, 2019), 
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Startups are typically unprofitable for long periods of time and “burning” 
money, which means many startups are frequently operating on the verge of 
bankruptcy. Moreover, by its nature, the venture-backed governance model tends 
to encourage risk-taking and aiming for potentially unattainable goals.147 Given the 
high rate of startup failures, each investment in a VC’s portfolio needs to potentially 
account for the entire return of the fund.148 Venture capitalists—with these 
incentives to push for mega hits—sit on and sometimes control the board.149  
CEO-founders often have invested seed money of their own or have 
relationships with investors, some of whom may be friends and family, which adds 
to stress about losing investor money and raising new money to keep the company 
going. Employees are also invested in the company though equity-based incentive 
compensation such that the potential payoff for the whole team, often personally 
recruited by the CEO-founder or executives, is typically at stake if the company 
cannot continue to show enough promise to raise successive financing. Further, 
startups are clustered in technology and at growth-stages of the life cycle—adding 
to challenges, the uncertainty of outcome, and the potential of failure. In sum, 
startups are often pressure cookers and most, if not all, startup participants have 
some form of equity “skin in the game” that adds to the urgency of survival and 
growth. 
Opportunity. Free from mandatory reporting requirements, private companies 
have enormous ability to take advantage of information asymmetries—they can 
publicize unaudited financials and share promising information about the company 
or not report at all.  
Because VCs stage their investments to deal with the uncertainty inherent in 
innovative startups, rounds of financing typically occur every 12-24 months,150 and 
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benefits all participants without putting them at odds with each other”); Griffith, supra note 90 
(“The nature of technology requires a degree of magical thinking to function. . . [E]ven the most 
well-intentioned startup founders have to persuade investors, engineers, and customers to 
believe in a future where their totally made-up idea will be real. . .”). 
148 THIEL, supra note 99, at 86-87 (noting that the typical pattern in a venture fund is that “a 
small handful of companies radically outperform all others”); Zider, supra note 99, at 131, 136 
(discussing the VC business model searching for mega hits). 
149 Pollman, supra note 89, at 202-03. 
150 D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 323 (2005) 
(describing staged financing); Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 86, at 3 (noting typical frequency 
of startups raising rounds of financing). 
	 28	
disclosures to investors are negotiated as part of this transaction.151 Standard 
financing documents include a stock purchase agreement that includes 
representations and warranties, with a schedule of exceptions that acts as an 
information-forcing device.152 These documents have tended to be relatively lightly 
negotiated in an effort to keep transaction costs down, particularly as VCs take a 
portfolio approach to investments and many startups ultimately fail.153 One 
consultant who helps investors conduct due diligence on startups estimates that 
three-quarters of the 150 early-stage startups he has investigated have pitched 
investors with misleading or purposely incomplete information.154 
In recent years, some high-profile startups have had leverage to keep 
information confidential—providing an opportunity to share misleading 
information and conceal or delay disclosing bad news. Investors in one of Uber’s 
late-stage rounds reportedly got no financial information beyond a set of risk 
factors.155 Shareholders in WeWork claim the CEO-founder’s conflicts of interest 
were not disclosed prior to the release of its IPO prospectus—once disclosed, these 
issues, among others, were deemed so problematic by public market investors that 
the valuation was adjusted down from its last private valuation of $47 billion to a 
suggested $20 billion—a number which still received so much skepticism the public 
offering failed to get out of the gate.156 	
151 See BRAD FELD & JASON MENDELSON, VENTURE DEALS 23 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing due 
diligence materials and negotiations for information). Shareholders may also negotiate for 
information rights or a board observer seat. See NVCA, Model Legal Documents, 
https://nvca.org/model-legal-documents/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2019) (providing for information 
and observer rights in model Investor Rights Agreement). 
152 See, e.g., NVCA, Model Legal Documents, supra note 151 (providing model venture capital 
financing documents); Claire A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms Theory 
of Incomplete Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 215 (2009) (discussing how information is 
communicated through the contracting process). 
153 These representations can be a minefield, however. For example, representations that a 
corporation is in legal compliance are common, but startups frequently bump up against 
regulatory issues, sometimes even purposely operating in legal gray areas or in violation of legal 
requirements. See, e.g., NVCA Model Legal Documents, § 2.9 Stock Purchase Agreement 
(including representation “The Company is not in violation or default . . .[to its knowledge,] of 
any provision of federal or state statute, rule or regulation applicable to the Company, the 
violation of which would have a Material Adverse Effect”); Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate 
Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709, 731-39 (2019) (discussing corporate disobedience related to 
innovation and entrepreneurship); Elizabeth Pollman, The Rise of Regulatory Affairs in Innovative 
Startups, in THE HANDBOOK ON LAW AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (D. 
Gordon Smith, Christine Hurt & Brian Broughman eds., forthcoming 2020) (identifying 
developments contributing to the rise of regulatory affairs in startups); Elizabeth Pollman & 
Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 398-402 (2017) (discussing 
regulatory entrepreneurship and breaking the law or taking advantage of legal gray areas). 
154 Griffith, supra note 90. 
155 Id. 
156 Maureen Farrell & Eliot Brown, WeWork Weighs Slashing Valuation by More Than Half Amid 
IPO Skepticism, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wework-parent-
weighs-slashing-its-valuation-roughly-in-half-11567689174; Liz Hoffman & Maureen Farrell, 
WeWork’s Valuation Falls to $8 Billion Under SoftBank Rescue Offer, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2019), 
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A number of other transactions such as share buybacks, tender offers, and 
M&A deals, similarly pose issues concerning the information that is disclosed by 
the company and provide an opportunity for material misrepresentations. For 
example, when Good Technology sold to BlackBerry, employees learned that while 
company executives had assured them not to worry and that the company had 
pathways to success including an IPO, in reality the company was lowering financial 
forecasts in investor documents and sliding toward a sale that demolished the value 
of the employees’ stock options.157 Some employees had exercised their stock 
options and paid taxes based on a common stock valuation ten times its ultimate 
worth—resulting in the situation that employees were “essentially…paying to work 
for the company.”158  
Furthermore, without periodic reporting and stock analysts, the mix of 
information available on the private capital market may be spotty at best, and a 
company’s “hype” to the media could have disproportionate or misleading effect. 
Such disclosures could be strategically used to pump valuations or hide misconduct 
or bad performance. Alternatively, insiders might trade on a secondary market 
without company-coordinated disclosures.159 
While the regulatory framework used to bifurcate more clearly the set of startup 
participants holding stock or options to those who were sophisticated or had access 
to information, now it is more likely that some of the shareholders or option holders 
will be in neither position and may be more easily misled or kept in the dark. 
Furthermore, companies may have not only the opportunity, but also an incentive 
to mislead startup employees into believing that their stock options are worth more 
than they actually are. Startups may convince employees to accept relatively meager 
salaries with the promise of stock options, and to keep them in their jobs to vest or 
receive refresh grants.160 They might promise employees liquidity events such as a 
planned IPO or buybacks.  
	
https://www.wsj.com/articles/softbank-offers-to-put-6-5b-into-wework-including-5b-loan-
11571687872. 
157 Katie Benner, When a Unicorn Start-Up Stumbles, Its Employees Get Hurt, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/27/technology/when-a-unicorn-start-up-
stumbles-its-employees-get-hurt.html. 
158 Id. 
159 See Pollman, supra note 23, at 216-21 (discussing the potential for insider trading in private 
company stock). 
160 See Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737, 1750 
(1994) (explaining that because startups provide “contingent compensation” in the form of 
equity, “employees sacrifice the higher cash salary” they might obtain at “more established 
companies”); Yifat Aran, Note, Beyond Covenants Not to Compete, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1235, 1263-75 
(2018) (describing the ability of stock options to “handcuff” employees to startups; see also 
Nicholas Iovino, Uber Accused of Luring Talent With False Promises, COURTHOUSE NEWS (Dec. 20, 
2016), https://www.courthousenews.com/uber-accused-of-luring-talent-with-false-promises/ 
(discussing class action lawsuit against Uber alleging it “lured hundreds of high-tech workers 
with false promises of more valuable stock options before quickly breaking that pledge for its 
own financial benefit”). 
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Palantir’s offer letter, for example, gave new hires the ability to choose among 
three different pay packages, with lower cash salaries corresponding to higher 
amounts of stock options—alongside a set of hypothetical valuations of the stock 
option grant imagining a scenario in which Palantir’s valuation were to grow to $50, 
$100, or even $200 billion.161 The letter noted: “Although the values in the table 
below are hypothetical and inherently uncertain, we want to emphasize our belief 
in Palantir’s potential to become a $100 billion company.” The potential for 
mischief is apparent.162 
Finally, the governance structure of venture-backed startups might present 
opportunity for carrying out securities fraud. Startup boards are typically dominated 
by founders and VCs—they typically allocate only one-quarter or fewer seats to 
independent directors.163 Some of the largest startups by valuation have dual-class 
structures that give control to founders through supervoting shares—further 
weakening governance mechanisms for oversight and discipline, as illustrated by 
the Theranos case.164 Empirical literature studying public companies has linked 
financial misconduct to corporate boards lacking independence or financial and 
accounting expertise165—both of which are commonplace in private companies. 	
161 William Alden, Ex-Palantir Employees Are Struggling to Sell Their Shares, BUZZFEED (Oct. 28, 
2016), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/williamalden/ex-palantir-employees-are-
struggling-to-sell-their-shares. 
162 Employees might be easily misled regarding the valuation of the company based on a 
preferred stock financing round versus their common stock. See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 
86, at 7 (noting that employees’ lack of knowledge of Square’s complex capital structure would 
lead to a 262% overvaluation of their stock options). 
163 See Brian J. Broughman, The Role of Independent Directors in Startup Firms, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 
461, 462 (discussing the composition of startup boards and independent directors); Pollman, 
supra note 89, at 200-09 (discussing lack of board independence and startup monitoring failures).  
164 See Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 165, 169 (2017)  
(arguing that “recent market trends and deregulatory reforms have weakened or eliminated the 
principal mechanisms that imposed discipline on start-up company founders”); Pollman, supra 
note 89, at 205 (discussing founder-friendly governance structures in startups and oversight 
weakness); see also Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 
YALE L.J. 560, 577-79, 589-90 (2016) (discussing dual-class structures and observing the value 
of entrepreneurs controlling management decisions to pursue their “idiosyncratic vision” under 
conditions of information asymmetry or differences of opinion). 
165 See, e.g., Mark S. Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director 
Composition and Financial Statement Fraud, 71 ACCT. REV. 443, 443-45 (1996) (finding that “no-
fraud firms have boards with significantly higher percentages of outside members than fraud 
firms”); Patricia M. Dechow, Richard G. Sloan & Amy P. Sweeney, Causes and Consequences of 
Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, 13 CONTEMP. 
ACCT. RES. 1, 1-2 (1996) (finding “an important motivation for earnings manipulation is the 
desire to attract external financing at low cost” and firms that manipulate earnings are more 
likely to have boards dominated by management and a CEO who is also the firm’s founder); 
Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals, 48 J. L. ECON. 371 
(2005) (finding “that the probability of restatement is lower in companies whose boards or audit 
committees have an independent director with financial expertise; it is higher in companies in 
which the chief executive officer belongs to the founding family”). 
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Rationalization. Startup and tech company culture have become known for 
the concept of “disruption” and slogans such as “move fast and break things.”166 
Innovative companies often bump up against, disregard, or even intentionally 
disobey laws in their quests to develop new technology.167 Recent research finds 
that people who become entrepreneurs are more likely than others to have had high 
self-esteem, to have scored highly on learning aptitude tests, and to have engaged 
in more disruptive, illicit activities in their youth.168 This kind of rule-breaking spirit 
and conduct has become normalized and even celebrated—from Steve Jobs flying 
the pirate flag at Apple to Uber’s early mantra “always be hustlin” which became 
“we do the right thing” once the company prepared to go public.169 Entrepreneurs 
may rationalize their behavior and business strategies through a process 
psychologists call moral disengagement, for example, thinking certain regulations 
are unnecessary and thus that it is not bad to violate them.170 There are various ways 
this process of moral disengagement or rationalizing mentality might play out in the 
context of securities fraud in private companies. 
The path to corporate fraud may start out with innocent confidence and 
optimism.171 Managers are known to be optimistic in their appraisals.172 Because 
startup founders in particular are often optimistic by nature and situationally 	
166 See THIEL, supra note 99, at 56 (“Silicon Valley has become obsessed with ‘disruption.’”); 
Hemant Taneja, The Era of ‘Move Fast and Break Things’ Is Over, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 22, 2019), 
https://hbr.org/2019/01/the-era-of-move-fast-and-break-things-is-over (“Many of today’s 
entrepreneurs live by Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg’s now-famous motto: ‘Move fast and 
break things.’”). 
167 Pollman, supra note 153, at 735. 
168 Ross Levine & Yona Rubinstein, Smart and Illicit: Who Becomes An Entrepreneur and Do They 
Earn More?, 132 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 963, 963 (2017) (“The combination of ‘smart’ and ‘illicit’ 
tendencies as youths accounts for both entry into entrepreneurship and the comparative 
earnings of entrepreneurs.”); see also Griffith, supra note 90 (quoting a startup industry insider 
that there is “a fine line between entrepreneurship and criminality”). 
169 Sarah Todd, The Steve Jobs Speech That Made Silicon Valley Obsessed With Pirates, QUARTZ (Oct. 
22, 2019) (noting that Steve Jobs had famously motivated Apple’s developers in 1983 by telling 
them “It’s better to be a pirate than join the navy” and explaining how the pirate flag came to 
embody “a certain willingness to plunder”); Jena McGregor, ‘Hustlin’ is out. Doing ‘the right thing’ 
is in. Uber has rewritten its notorious list of core values, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2017/11/08/hustlin-is-out-
doing-the-right-thing-is-in-uber-has-rewritten-its-notorious-list-of-core-values/ (quoting Dara 
Khosrowshahi, who replaced the CEO-founder, stating: “the culture and approach that got 
Uber where it is today is not what will get us to the next level”). 
170 Noam Scheiber, The Shkreli Syndrome: Youthful Trouble, Tech Success, Then a Fall, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/14/business/entrepreneur-young-
trouble.html (quoting psychologist Laurence Steinberg); see also LANGEVOORT, supra note 31, at 
42 (“Culture enables beliefs about the law’s legitimacy that can be either positive or negative 
relative to other values, and when the latter, compliance falls.”). 
171 Survey evidence indicates that financial managers believe excessive optimism is common 
among their peers. See Robert Libby & Kristina Rennekamp, Self-Serving Attribution Bias, 
Overconfidence and the Issuance of Management Forecasts, 50 J. ACCT. RES. 197, 198-200 (2012). 
172 Anwer S. Ahmed & Scott Duellman, Managerial Overconfidence and Accounting Conservatism, 51 J. 
ACCT. RES. 1, 2-4 (2013).  
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encouraged to aim for home runs for their venture capital investors, estimates may 
be favorably high.173 When performance falls short, a manager or founder’s 
tendency is often to interpret this as a temporary setback that can be overcome and 
so might deny the bad news.174 The small step from innocent optimism to denying 
negative developments may fall into mental blindspots or be rationalized by self-
serving wishful thinking. 
From this point, innocent optimism might evolve into deliberate deception.175 
The manager or founder might deflect the truth to buy time.176 They might chose 
to follow down this slippery slope of deception particularly as founders or managers 
realize that the company and its stakeholders, including employees and customers, 
would be hurt if the deception were revealed.177  
The cognitive pressure to justify deception grows, particularly as the actor has 
already committed to a rosier narrative. As Donald Langevoort has observed, “[t]he 
more leaders believe in group goals, the more they think of themselves as justified 
in taking unethical actions on behalf of the group.”178 Research also indicates that 
trying to meet “frustratingly high performance goals” depletes ethicality and can 
make eventual dishonesty more likely.179 If the situation does not improve and the 
company is truly in trouble, the genuine optimism from the outset might be replaced 
with fear about survival and the possibility that the managers or founder will be 
viewed as having lied all along.180  
Many frauds go through stages of awareness that end with a guilty state of 
mind.181 In private companies, without public disclosures of quarterly earnings and 
analysts, this “optimism-commitment” pattern could fester for longer periods of 
time or manifest in particularly pernicious forms of pressure for risk-taking activity 
to achieve or maintain high valuations. Startups often lack internal controls and 
outside auditing that could detect problems before they evolve into the stage of 
intentional deception.182 And, once detected, insiders and investors might choose 	
173 See Noam Wasserman, How an Entrepreneur’s Passion Can Destroy a Startup, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
25, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-an-entrepreneur-s-passion-can-destroy-a-
startup-1408912044 (describing research analyzing 16,000 startup founders and finding the 
“consistent theme” is their “passion” and “contagious enthusiasm”). 
174 LANGEVOORT, supra note 31, at 19. 
175 See Catherine M. Schrand & Sarah L. C. Zechman, Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery Slope 
to Financial Misreporting, 51 J. ACCT. & ECON. 311 (2012). 
176 LANGEVOORT, supra note 31, at 36. 
177 Id. at 36 (“Psychology research shows that people are more willing to cheat when the benefit 
will go to a family member or colleague rather than only to themselves.”). 
178 Id. (citing Crystal L. Hoyt, Terry L. Price & Alyson E. Emrick, Leadership and the More-
Important-Than-Average Effect: Overestimation of Group Goals and the Justification of Unethical Behavior, 6 
LEADERSHIP, 391, 391-93 (2010)). 
179 Id. (citing David T. Welsh & Lisa D. Ordóñez, The Dark Side of Consecutive High Performance 
Goals: Linking Goal Setting, Depletion, and Unethical Behavior, 123 ORG. BEHAVIOR & HUMAN 
DECISION PROCESSES 79, 80-81 (2014)), 
180 Id. at 35. 
181 Id. at 43. 
182 See David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Scaling Up: The Implementation of Corporate Governance in 
Pre-IPO Companies, Stanford Closer Look Series, Dec. 2018, 
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to bury the fraud rather than expose it and risk being associated with the 
misconduct. Private companies often offer the opportunity for more active 
engagement which might both facilitate detection but also risk complicity. Research 
suggests “that dysfunctional corporate cultures are a main reason that frauds 
occur.”183  
Furthermore, the rationalization of fraud seems to spread through contagion of 
business culture or competitive pressures. One study found that the incidence of 
financial fraud by one company makes it more likely that others, even in different 
industries, will commit fraud too.184 This research calls to mind the stock option 
backdating scandal that spread through Silicon Valley in the early 2000s, perhaps 
through directors serving on interlocking boards of directors, learning to play 
accounting games.185 In sum, all of the contextual factors or elements that can give 
rise to fraud not only exist, but are relatively commonplace in the private market, 
particularly in venture-backed startups. 
 
C. Obstacles to Rule 10b-5 Class Actions in Private Markets 
 
The previous sections have examined the growth of the private capital market 
and the potential for securities fraud. This section analyzes the differences that 
prevent securities fraud class actions from playing a similar role in the private 
market as in the public. Although contested, private class actions are understood to 
serve a monitoring and deterrence function186—something that the private capital 	
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/publications/scaling-implementation-
corporate-governance-pre-ipo-companies; Fran (2004) (discussing the role of auditors in 
preventing and detecting fraud). 
183 LANGEVOORT, supra note 31, at 41; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A 
Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 
146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 107 (1997) (“providing a robust set of explanations for why managers 
of a public corporation would mislead stock market investors either in their filings or in ongoing 
publicity efforts” including an institutional theory of “corporate cultural biases, particularly 
optimistic ones” that serve as “adaptive mechanisms for encouraging trust and cooperation”). 
184 Christopher A. Parsons, Johan Sulaeman & Sheridan Titman, The Geography of Financial 
Misconduct, 73 J. FIN. 2087 (2018). 
185 John M. Bizjak, Michael L. Lemmon & Ryan J. Whitby, Options Backdating and Board Interlocks, 
22 REV. FIN. STUD. 4821, 4822-23 (2009). 
186 See Hillary A. Sale & Robert B. Thompson, Market Intermediation, Publicness, and Securities Class 
Actions, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 487 (2015) (‘Securities class actions play a crucial, if contested, role 
in the policing of securities fraud and the protection of securities markets.”); William W. Bratton 
& Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 69-71 
(2011) (arguing that “a superior enforcement outcome” would require private plaintiffs “to meet 
an actual-reliance standard” and, because this would diminish private litigation, “a compensating 
increase in public-enforcement capability” is due); Jill E. Fisch, Federal Securities Fraud Litigation 
as a Lawmaking Partnership, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 453, 453-57 (2015) (arguing that the 
collaboration between Congress and the Supreme Court to develop the private class action for 
federal securities fraud is a “lawmaking partnership” that offers the advantages of efficiency, 
political insulation, and comparative institutional competence); Rose, supra note 47, at 50 
(arguing that “[fraud-on-the-market (FOTM)] suits might be thought of as a way for 
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market needs. A variety of factors may explain why securities class actions have not 
played a significant role to date in the private capital market: the lack of fluid pricing 
to identify potential suits, impediments to aggregate litigation, and the different 
economics of the lawsuit. 
As to the first, the private capital market is no longer entirely opaque regarding 
pricing, but even with significant increases in secondary trading, it is a semi-illiquid 
market lacking informational efficiency and transparency. Because venture-backed 
startups typically issue preferred stock to investors such as VCs and other 
institutional investors, the price of a particular series of stock reflects a specific set 
of contractual features that varies from other series issued by the same company.187 
Significant amounts of time often pass in between rounds of stock issuances and 
there may be no trading in between, while new material information is developing 
for the company. Valuations reflect the views of the company’s enthusiasts; it is not 
possible to short sell private company stock.188 Moreover, views can vary widely 
about valuation and can change dramatically with little notice or transparency.189 All 
of these factors contribute to the lack of available information about stock price 
that would allow attorneys to monitor for stock drops followed by corrective 
disclosures—a typical technique for identifying potential securities fraud suits.190  
As a related point, there might be significant frictions to bringing aggregate 
litigation in the private company context. Most obviously, the fraud-on-the-market 
theory would not apply given the lack of an efficient market as described by the 
	
shareholders to outsource the monitoring of corporate agents. . . the class action bar—lured by 
the prospect of large attorneys’ fees—is delegated the job of detecting FOTM; once the 
discovered fraud is revealed through the filing of a class action complaint, shareholders may in 
turn impose punishment as appropriate. . .”). 
187 Pollman, supra note 89, at 172-74; Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 86, at 1. 
188 See Matt Levine, Money Stuff: The Trades Will Be Free Now, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-10-02/the-trades-will-be-free-now 
(noting that markets correct pricing through supply principles). For a discussion of how 
“negative activists can play an important, and indeed helpful, role in financial markets” see 
Barbara A. Bliss, Peter Molk & Frank Partnoy, Negative Activism, at 39, forthcoming WASH. U. 
L. REV. 2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3341567. 
189 For example, Morgan Stanley’s mutual funds valued Palantir at $4.4 billion at the same time 
as several other Palantir investors appraised it higher and Morgan Stanley’s own bankers 
predicted the company could price at $36 to $41 billion in an IPO. Lizette Chapman & Sonali 
Basak, Palantir Tried Buying Morgan Stanley’s Stake in Value Feud, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-14/palantir-said-to-try-buying-morgan-
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190 See supra note 80; see also Park, supra note 111, at 141 (2017) (“Securities law targets a particular 
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This point highlights that public market stock prices are a public good. See Clayton, 2019 
Remarks, supra note 84 (“Prices for stocks, bonds, and other assets, generated by markets that 
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‘public goods.’ Generally, once prices are published, we can all use them.”); De Fontenay, supra 
note 93, at 449 (“[P]ublic companies’ mandatory disclosure and stock trading prices provide a 
major information subsidy to private companies . . .”). 
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Supreme Court in Basic v. Levinson, and affirmed in Halliburton II.191 The individual 
reliance of each shareholder would have to be shown.192 More generally, the 
shareholders might be positioned differently such that a class could not be easily 
maintained. Shareholders in startups often vary in the amounts of different classes 
and series of stock that they hold on different terms.193 
Furthermore, there could be difficulty in actually building a class of 
shareholders who want to be included in the lawsuit. Traditional VC and private 
equity investors have been assumed to be sophisticated players who understand and 
manage these risks. They perform their own due diligence and place bets in a 
portfolio of companies, knowing that many may fail for various reasons, including 
misconduct or mismanagement. In particular, the portfolio approach of VC 
investing that seeks a small number of mega-hits allows for a buffer for some 
amount of loss from fraud. There may be little to gain from pursuing private action 
against bad actors in these situations—no deep pockets to seek recompense and it 
could be bad for a VC’s reputation.194 Further, some VCs actively manage their 
investments by sitting on company boards and might have failed to catch the fraud 
and be exposed to risk of litigation in their own right.  
This point has its limits, however. While the rationale of risk spreading through 
a portfolio of investments may work for venture capitalists and private equity 
investors more generally, it does not eliminate the potential impact of a massive 
business failure on other shareholders (and stakeholders).195 Furthermore, with 
private companies reaching high valuations and staying private longer, the potential 
impact is greater in terms of financial magnitude and number and type of 	
191 See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. For arguments that the fraud-on-the-market 
theory should not be limited by the concept of the efficient market hypothesis, see Zohar 
Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 712 
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when markets are inefficient”); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock 
Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 176 (2002) (arguing 
that “the [efficient market hypothesis] is unnecessary to justify the Court’s approach” to fraud-
on-the-market reliance and “[o]ne can readily justify the presumption as the only workable way 
to facilitate private litigation in this area, substituting causation in place of reliance”). 
192 This might be an impediment to maintaining suit as a class or add cost to doing so, but it 
might be possible to show reliance through transaction-specific documents. See Glater, supra 
note 23, at 50-51 (“An investor who files a lawsuit alleging fraud after purchasing securities 
through a private placement (a transaction available essentially by invitation only) can draw on 
transaction-specific information that is more detailed and relevant than disclosures in an annual 
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193 Pollman, supra note 89, at 176-99 (explaining that differences in shareholder positions in 
startups and terms can give rise to conflicts among shareholders of all types). 
194 See David Rosenberg, The Two “Cycles” of Venture Capital, 28 J. CORP. L. 419, 420-21 (2003) 
(discussing reputation and generally high overall fund returns as reasons why there has 
historically been little litigation in the venture capital ecosystem); see also Lee Harris, A Critical 
Theory of Private Equity, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 259, 293 (2010) (noting historically little litigation in 
the private equity context between fund managers and investors). 
195 See Johnson, supra note 25, at 197-98 (“Such antifraud-only markets may be acceptable for 
institutional players, but they are not designed for individual investors.”).  
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participants affected. Even venture capitalists may not fare well with the rationale 
of spreading risk through a portfolio approach when valuations are skyrocketing.  
The economics of the lawsuit, however, might truly be problematic for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys. Attorneys’ fees are largely driven by recoveries.196 Therefore, 
“the larger the potential payout, the more willing a rational plaintiff’s lawyer is to 
pursue a case with a smaller likelihood of success.”197 This dynamic likely attracts 
attorneys toward large public corporation cases, even if there are meritorious cases 
against private companies. Furthermore, the number of shareholders affected to 
join a class action will nearly always be fewer than in the public company context—
by sheer virtue of the fact that private companies avoid the 2,000 holders of record 
trigger of section 12(g) of the 1934 Act so that they can stay private.198 The 
availability (or lack) of directors and officers (D&O) insurance, depending on the 
company, in the private company context might also affect the prospect of suit 
from the attorneys’ perspectives.199 In addition, given the potentially smaller scale 
of lawsuit, the expense of hiring experts could also make bringing suit less attractive 
as a matter of economics. 
Finally, compensatory money damages do not fit conceptually or practically in 
the same way as in public company securities class actions. In the public company 
setting, one of the key criticisms is that because corporate defendants tend to 
exclusively fund settlements, it is the public company shareholders who ultimately 
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197 Rose, supra note 47, at 47; see also Berdejó, supra note 23, at 581 (“The structure of attorney 
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pay, giving rise to a “circularity” of the money flows.200 As some class members will 
continue to hold shares, some portion of the class will fund a portion of their own 
recovery, and, on a macro level, over time they will be on the paying side as often 
as on the receiving side. Diversified investors in public company stock may not, 
therefore, ultimately benefit on a net basis from fraud-on-the-market settlements—
they may simply “produce wealth transfers among shareholders that neither 
compensate nor deter.”201  
Private company shareholders generally do not have the same circularity 
problem on a macro level because they are often not truly diversified. However, 
private company shareholders have a different potential problem that is more likely: 
The company may not have funds available for a settlement or to pay damages, the 
individuals responsible may not have deep pockets, and any payout might 
effectively be the shareholder’s own money. Taking Theranos, for example, the 
SEC levied a variety of fines and penalties, but only a relatively small sum of money 
might be recovered from Elizabeth Holmes and the shares being returned had little 
value as the company was already in bankruptcy with few assets.202  
On the whole, for the reasons explained, plaintiffs’ attorneys face obstacles to 
bringing securities fraud class actions in the private company context and, in many 
circumstances, investors may have little incentive to sue. Sophisticated investors 
might price this reality into their investments and instead invest in ex ante 
monitoring mechanisms—which could work reasonably well on an individual level 
for some investors but represent significant deadweight costs in the aggregate that 
skews the efficient allocation of capital in this increasingly important sector of the 
economy. 
 
III. The Future of Policing Fraud in Private Markets 
 
The previous Parts have illuminated the development of Rule 10b-5 in the 
public market paradigm and the lack of fit of this jurisprudence to the private 
markets, despite the potential for widespread misconduct. The dominant mode of 
securities fraud enforcement in the public company context is through private class 
action suits brought by plaintiff lawyers. This mechanism is lacking in the private 
market context and unlikely to develop in a similar fashion.  
This confluence of factors leads to the question of what, if anything, should be 
done about securities fraud in the private markets. This Part takes up that question 
by examining a variety of potential responses. Although there is some merit to the 
status quo approach, a stronger case exists for increasing public enforcement and 
further considering bolder or more finely-tuned regulatory change. 	
200 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay On Deterrence and Its 
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1535-36, 1558 (2006); Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the 
Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 333, 334. 
201 Id. at 1536; see also Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 
U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 626 (1985). 
202 See Reed Abelson, Theranos Is Shutting Down, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/health/theranos-shutting-down.html. 
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A.  Leaving the Lights Off  
 
Debate about the optimal amount of securities fraud enforcement has raged 
with little regard for private companies. One view upon examination of the issue 
might be that little, if anything, additional needs to be done. The SEC’s resources 
are limited.203 To the extent that securities class actions are ineffective in achieving 
compensation of victims or deterrence of wrongful conduct, critics might urge that 
this activity not be imported into the private capital market.204  
Indeed, some observers might view the relative paucity of securities litigation 
in private companies as an advantage of staying private.205 Venture capitalists are 
key victims of securities fraud in the startup context and they already have some 
incentive to engage in due diligence and monitoring. If liability were to increase, 
venture-backed startups would likely pay more for insurance, which in turn might 
increase the cost of investment without creating corresponding gain for investors 
or—worse yet—chill entrepreneurship and innovation. A similar story can be told 
about private equity investors more generally and the optimal level of liability and 
insurance. 
Furthermore, reasonable minds might differ regarding how to balance the goals 
of investor protection and capital formation. The JOBS Act, for example, provides 
for new deregulated forms of capital-raising such as crowdfunding, based on the 
notion “that putting more risk on these investors is worth it to enable small-
business entrepreneurship and job creation.”206 Similarly with respect to securities 
fraud in the private market, one might believe “the social good offset[s] the investor 
harm suffered.”207 For example, Donald Langevoort explains this viewpoint as one 
of pursuing the greater good—“Amid all the creative destruction when the [late 
1990s] bubble formed and then popped, the Internet was born and began maturing, 
with the United States well in the lead in global technology innovation.”208 Within 
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bounds, “a moderate excess of investor confidence can enhance capital formation. 
If so, . . . [t]he law should take a light touch. . .”209 
Another viewpoint in support of the status quo might focus on the nature of 
innovative technology companies that constitute a significant portion of the private 
capital market. As valuations of private technology startups are at times subjective 
or unreliable, one might worry that increased securities litigation and enforcement 
would have an overdeterrent effect because valuation fluctuations and failures 
might be confused with misconduct in hindsight.  
Along a similar vein, innovative companies may need a long leash during the 
early part of their lifecycle. It may be that “in an economy that values innovation 
and aggressiveness—creative disruption—transparency doesn’t work well. Private 
equity-style financing, allowing more confidential forms of governance, may be 
better.”210 Venture and private-equity backed companies may benefit on average 
from being allowed to operate largely in the dark and not to disclose significant 
amounts of information while they are in their most innovative or transformational 
phase—for competitive reasons and to give the company space to nimbly adjust 
and pivot from product ideas or business models. Furthermore, from the 
perspective of VCs, early stage investing is anyway speculative and investment 
decisions are largely made on intuitions about the promise of the team and market 
opportunity.211 Enforcing representations about early-stage investments makes little 
sense if the parties involved understood, despite the hype, that the company was 
high-risk and the bet was on future performance. In addition, for a VC it might 
make little difference if a loss in the portfolio comes from a company that made 
material misstatements or one that simply failed to successfully execute the business 
plan or develop technology—in fact, on the whole they might prefer to invest in 
teams and companies that push boundaries even if that means that some will cross 
the line.212    
Most fundamentally, one might argue that investors in private capital markets 
are typically sophisticated or accredited investors such that they can bear the loss 
and are not a vulnerable class.213 Private equity and venture-backed governance is 
often assumed to have fewer agency costs because ownership and control are not 	
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 165; Jerold L. Zimmerman, The Role of Accounting in the 21st Century Firm, 45 ACCT. BUS. 
RES. 485 (2015). 
211 See SCOTT KUPOR, SECRETS OF SAND HILL ROAD: VENTURE CAPITAL AND HOW TO GET IT 
42-52 (2019) (explaining that early-stage VCs decide to invest based on people and team, the 
process the founder used to get to the current product idea, and market size). 
212 See, e.g., Polina Marinova, Why VC Tim Draper Keeps Defending Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes, 
FORTUNE (May 11, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/05/11/tim-draper-theranos-elizabeth-
holmes/ (“Look, when I’m an investor in a startup, I assume that 60% of them are going to go 
out of business. I make my money on a few extraordinary companies. Theranos was one of 
those extraordinary companies that could’ve been one of those big, huge winners.”). 
213 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Poor Pitiful or Potently Powerful Preferred?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2025, 
2029 (2013) (observing that investors who buy preferred stock in startups are “quite 
sophisticated”). 
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entirely separated and investors play a monitoring role.214 As the next section 
explores, however, this view does not account for potential harms to other 
shareholders and stakeholders. 
 
B. Increasing Public Enforcement 
 
The threat of SEC engagement has hung over Silicon Valley and the world of 
technology startups as the private capital market grows. In 2016, then-SEC Chair 
Mary Jo White gave a speech at Stanford Law School, encouraging startups to 
concern themselves with transparent disclosure, financial controls, and good 
corporate governance.215 She noted that the SEC was watching the secondary 
market for trading pre-IPO shares.216 The previous year, the SEC brought its first 
enforcement under the Dodd-Frank Act’s rules that require registering security-
based swaps or limiting them to “eligible contract participants.”217 Specifically, the 
SEC detected violations by a Silicon Valley-based startup, Sand Hill Exchange, that 
was illegally offering and selling derivative contracts based on the value of pre-IPO 
shares.218 The platform was quickly shut down.219 Further, not long after Chair 
White’s speech, the SEC launched its investigation of Theranos, which eventually 
resulted in a settlement with CEO-founder Elizabeth Holmes, discussed above.220  
Yet, despite these warnings, the relative infrequency of actions has given an 
empty tone to the SEC threat.221 Until startups prepare to go public, they are under 	
214 Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Board 3.0: An Introduction, 74 BUS. LAW. 351, 359 
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and critiquing the conventional view that VCs are strong monitors). 
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221 Before Chair White’s 2016 speech in Silicon Valley, one of the few private company 
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no obligation to follow advice for better governance and may be unlikely to take 
heed without a greater likelihood of SEC activity in the space. Some observers were 
quick to criticize the lack of clarity from the SEC, noting that vague threats 
regarding SEC interest in frothy valuations only adds uncertainty.222 
A variety of arguments weigh in favor of increasing SEC enforcement through 
clear and consistent action. Above all, the sheer size of the private company market 
and certain late-stage mature startups means that if the SEC maintains the 
longstanding allocation of enforcement between public and private markets, it is 
giving considerably fewer proportional resources than in times past to the private 
side of the line.223 Higher enforcement might encourage allocational efficiency and 
the quality of private company offerings.224  
Furthermore, VCs are not always the strong monitors they are assumed to be 
because they serve in overlapping roles as board members and shareholders and 
they are repeat institutional players in a reputation-based market for investments.225 
The “fire-the-founder” era of the twentieth century gave way to a “founder-
friendly” era of the twenty-first century with competitive pressures.226 Startup 
governance may not sufficiently constrain the social costs of high-growth, 
innovative startups.227  
Additionally, VCs can spread their risk through a portfolio of investments, but 
this does not eliminate the potential impact of securities fraud on other shareholders 
and stakeholders. Accredited investor status does not necessarily reflect true 
sophistication.228 Retail investors are exposed to securities fraud in private 	
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12, 2011, https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-261.htm. 
222 See Mark Cuban: Here’s the problem with regulators, CNBC  (Apr. 1, 2016), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/01/mark-cuban-heres-the-problem-with-regulators.html. 
223 The SEC also has certain advantages over private litigants. See Buell, supra note 20, at 545 
(“When it charges securities fraud, the SEC is not a victim seeking damages, so it need not show 
that it did anything, much less that it acted in reliance on anything the defendant did. Nor does 
the SEC need to show that it suffered any loss.”). 
224 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 
230 (2007) (arguing that “higher enforcement intensity gives the U.S. economy a lower cost of 
capital and higher securities valuations”); Hillary A. Sale, Disclosure’s Purpose, 107 GEO. L.J. 1045, 
1065 (2019) (“When coupled with enforcement and litigation, the system is design to increase 
the odds of a strong and healthy market system—where fraud is policed and punished and 
capital is allocated efficiently.”). 
225 Pollman, supra note 89, at 200-08 (explaining why some startup boards have monitoring 
failures). 
226 Steve Blank, When Founders Go Too Far, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov.-Dec. 2017), 
https://hbr.org/2017/11/when-founders-go-too-far. 
227 Id. 
228 Rodrigues, supra note 63, at 1558-59 (noting that trading even among accredited investors 
“raises serious questions about investor protection—at least if one believes, as many scholars 
do—that accredited investor status does not equate to sophistication.”); see also Howard M. 
Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae in Contemporary Securities 
Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291, 291 (1994); Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes “The 
Myth of the Sophisticated Investor”, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 215, 253 (2010). 
	 42	
companies through their investments in mutual funds and pension funds. 
Employees often receive a significant portion of their compensation as stock or 
stock options and they cannot easily diversify their risk—they can only work full-
time for one company at a time and they are usually not in a position to invest in 
other private companies. And, critically, the harm to employees, consumers, and 
others from large business failures can be significant. As Urska Velikonja has 
argued, empirical evidence suggests that “harm to nonshareholders dwarfs that 
suffered by defrauded shareholders” and these “other market participants cannot 
easily self-insure.”229 Given the large footprint of some private companies, the 
impact on the public can be meaningful.230 
Protective devices that sophisticated investors contract for in VC deals such as 
IPO ratchets in some way counteract harm from fraud—but that only protects the 
holder of the right, typically the last money invested in a company, and other 
investors and stakeholders might suffer. Employees typically hold common stock 
or options, not preferred stock with contractual mechanisms.231 Their stock or 
options are based on valuations that they typically do not have the ability or leverage 
to negotiate. Particularly where there is a vulnerable or harmed class of employees, 
the SEC may be better positioned to take action as the harmed individuals may not 
have the means to pursue action and courts might find that employees who are only 
option holders lack standing.232  
Finally, one study explored the factors that correlate with higher or lower levels 
of fraud around the time of an IPO, finding that firms’ incentives to commit fraud 
interact with investors’ beliefs and monitoring incentives.233 The study found that 
“when venture capitalists are present or when venture capitalists enjoy a high level 
of industry expertise, fraud is less likely for low investor beliefs but more likely for 
high investor beliefs.”234 This finding suggests “that voluntary monitoring by 	
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institutional investors or venture capitalists is less effective at reducing fraud when 
investors are optimistic about an industry’s prospects.”235 Thus, “[i]f regulators 
want to reduce fraud in order to avoid [the] externalities and negative consequences 
of fraud, more regulatory vigilance in good times may be needed.”236 This research 
suggests that as the private capital market grows, the SEC should proportionately 
scale or otherwise increase its enforcements efforts and remain engaged even during 
periods of growth and enthusiasm. Federal prosecutors and state attorneys general 
may also have an increased role to play to effectuate an optimal quantity and quality 
of enforcement.237 
 
C. Adjusting the Public-Private Line 
 
The debate engaged thus far operates on the existing regulatory framework and 
considers how greater public oversight and enforcement are warranted given the 
growth of the private capital market and the weakness of private securities litigation. 
The discussion has also highlighted a concern that some of the shareholders and 
option holders in the private market will not be wealthy, sophisticated, or have 
access to information and may be more easily misled or kept in the dark. Further, 
retail investors are now exposed to the private market through mutual and pension 
funds, just as they are to the public market—and more broadly, other stakeholders 
such as consumers may also be impacted by private companies that are not 
subjected to the discipline that securities fraud class actions can impose. 
The observations highlighted in this Article therefore not only raise the possible 
need for greater public oversight and enforcement in the private market but also 
point to a larger issue and potential policy response—a redrawing of the public-
private line. A growing scholarly debate has generated a variety of proposals to this 
end, but it has focused on the need for disclosure as the rationale rather than the 
problem of securities fraud. The motivating philosophy of our securities law 
framework, however, envisions both disclosure and sanction and enforcement 
against fraud as reinforcing mechanisms for protection of investors and the general 
public. This Article may therefore bolster the rising voices pushing for re-
examination of the public-private divide. 
The literature, for example, includes scholarship championing redrawing the 
public-private line with a tiered approach by reference either to market 
capitalization or trading volume.238 One such proposal would require companies 
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that hit the public threshold to go through a seasoning period during which they 
would make periodic disclosures before making public offerings.239 Supporting this 
view is the promise that it might promote efficient capital formation, eliminate 
waste currently associated with IPOs, and more vigorously protect unsophisticated 
investors in the public markets.240 More broadly, the proposals for a tiered 
approach, particularly by trading volume, harken back to the original idea that gave 
rise to section 12(g) and cohere with the logic of needing public disclosure.241 
Other scholars have proposed a system of scaled disclosure that would create 
more than a two-bucket public-private divide and account for the social footprint 
or “publicness” of large companies.242 These arguments recognize that theoretical 
justifications for mandatory disclosure are grounded in benefits to all citizens, not 
only investors.243 Further, a graduated approach to public disclosure might better 
reflect the different types of corporations and their societal impacts.244  
Without further study of the frequency and magnitude of fraud in the private 
market, it is far from clear that a bold re-drawing of the public-private line would 	
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be justified on that basis alone. The growth of the private market relatively free 
from securities fraud scrutiny does, however, present a new argument in favor of at 
least taking a hard look at the issue. Political economy forces could have led the 
SEC to allow for private capital market growth beyond its optimal size or the 
expansion might be the unintended consequence of a series of smaller regulatory 
and market changes.245  
As the SEC has recently signaled that it is on the precipice of further expanding 
access to the private market and liberalizing restrictions on capital formation, it is 
particularly important to reflect on how these goals could be achieved while 
lessening the harms of fraud in the private market.246 The public-private line could 
be redrawn or smaller measures along that path could be considered, such as fixing 
easily manipulated metrics such as “record” shareholders or allowing for some 
measure of short-selling in the private market to create a mechanism for downward 
price pressure and signaling.  
 
D. Exploring Alternative Mechanisms to Increase Accountability in Private  
Companies 
 
Another broader implication of the developments discussed in this Article is 
that securities fraud might operate somewhat differently in the private company 
context. Some of the conventional “gatekeepers” such as securities analysts and 
credit-rating agencies are absent from the private market.247 Without a public 
market and active trading, there are no stock price drops for plaintiffs’ attorneys to 
find potential class actions with low search costs.  
With these differences in mechanisms to identify and enforce securities fraud, 
the non-traditional players (employees, media, and industry regulators) may take on 
greater importance as monitors in the private market.248 The Theranos case, for 
example, highlights the role that an employee whistleblower can play in bringing 
alleged fraud to light.249 Employees reached out to the media, which then 
investigated and reported to the public, attracting the attention of the SEC and the 
	
245 See Gubler, supra note 104, at 753 (arguing that “the political economy forces identified here 
will likely lead the SEC to expand the private securities market beyond its optimal scope”); Usha 
Rodrigues, Dictation and Delegation in Securities Regulation, 92 IND. L.J. 435, 468-73 (2017) 
(describing the political context and industry players involved in the passage of the JOBS Act).  
246 See Pritchard, supra note 56, at 1024 (noting “we should funnel transactions to the venues that 
make it most difficult to get way with fraud”). 
247 JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1-
3 (2006) (defining “gatekeepers” and listing “auditors, attorneys, securities analysts, credit-rating 
agencies and investment bankers”). 
248 Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?,  65 
J. FIN. 2213 (2010) (finding that fraud detection “takes a village of several non-traditional players 
(employees, media, and industry regulators” and “[h]aving access to information or monetary 
rewards has a significant impact on the probability a stakeholder becomes a whistleblower”). 
249 See CARREYROU, supra note 7, at 185-200 (describing the role of the employee whistleblower). 
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DOJ.250 Subsequently, other regulators such as the FDA also then took action to 
protect the public interest.251   
Two types of actors hold notable promise: employees and trading marketplaces. 
Each offers a different potential avenue for increasing accountability in private 
companies—one internal and one external. 
First, employees are particularly well positioned to serve as monitors in private 
companies because they are some of the only individuals with access to information. 
Rank-and-file employees are typically not privy to financing documents, but they 
may be involved in technology development, creating marketing materials and pitch 
decks, and producing information for the due diligence process. Red flags can 
appear in any of these information-producing activities and might alert employees 
to potential securities fraud and allow them to gather relevant information that 
could be brought to light.  
Further, because employees in startups frequently hold stock options or shares 
of common stock, they may have more incentive to take on this monitoring role.252 
Not only are they equity holders, they may in some sense be understood as the 
residual claimants to the value of the firm.253 The flip side of this point is that stock 
options might in some circumstances have the opposite effect of encouraging 
employees to hide fraud or participate in it as they may believe exposure could affect 
their own financial reward. For this reason, relying on employees for fraud detection 
is likely insufficient, but could be given a better chance of success by exploring new 
mechanisms to provide employees with greater voice in governance such as through 
board access or work councils.254 
Relatedly, another approach would not rely on employees as a resource, but 
rather recognize that they are the key group to protect from securities fraud harm 
in the private market. To the extent that private equity and venture capital investors 
are sophisticated and do not need protection, the greatest concern is for the class 	
250 Id. at 294-96. 
251 Id. 
252 See Sharon Hannes, Reverse Monitoring: On the Hidden Role of Employee Stock-Based Compensation, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1421 (2007) (proposing that “recipient employees be viewed as 
potential monitors of other employees and that stock options (or similar types of compensation) 
motivate them to fulfill this task”). 
253 See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013) (equating the common 
shareholders in venture-backed startups to residual claimants). For commentary critiquing an 
approach to fiduciary duty that fails to maximize aggregate firm value, see Robert P. Bartlett, 
III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as Means to an End, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255 (2015); William 
W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815 (2013); 
Pollman, supra note 89, at 216-20.  
254 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism 5-6 (Univ. of Pennsylvania 
Inst. for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 19-39, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3461924 (proposing rule requiring 
“boards of large, socially important companies to create workforce committees to address 
workforce issues at the board level”); Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, From Shareholder 
Primacy To Shared Governance (on file with author) (arguing for increased worker voice in corporate 
governance); Kent Greenfield, Saving the World with Corporate Law?, 57 EMORY L.J. 947 (2007) 
(arguing for stakeholder governance). 
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of working investors in private companies—the employees with equity-based 
compensation.  
For years, federal securities law has magnified the importance of private 
exemptions and accredited investor status while turning a blind eye to concerns 
about startup employees. A fresh evaluation of Rule 701 on compensatory offerings 
is warranted, with an understanding that startup employees make important, firm-
specific investments.255 Rather than easing disclosure requirements by raising the 
Rule 701 threshold,256 the SEC could take an approach that looks at the changing 
informational needs of working investors and better recognizes their particular 
needs and vulnerabilities.257 The response to securities fraud in the private market 
might thus look quite different from the public market paradigm of securities class 
actions, while responding to the vulnerabilities of those most affected.  
Second, a different potential avenue for increasing accountability in private 
companies could look to the trading marketplaces to play a stronger role as 
gatekeepers.258 Currently these intermediaries such as Nasdaq Private Market and 
	
255 See Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 265 (2005) (“By 
locking in capital, board governance also attracts firm-specific investments and commitments 
from a variety of other groups. . . Employees from the shop floor to the corner office may be 
more willing to acquire firm-specific skills and to contribute extra hours and extra effort.”); 
Aran, supra note 118, at 104 (“Employee recipients of equity compensation are generally not 
financially sophisticated, and, typically, they do not qualify as accredited investors who would 
be permitted to participate in a private placement of their employees’ securities.”). 
256 Exempt Offerings Pursuant to Compensatory Arrangements (July 23, 2018), 17 CFR Part 
230, https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2018/33-10520.pdf (raising from $5 million to $10 
million the aggregate sales price or amount of securities sold during any consecutive 12-month 
period in excess of which an issuer is required to deliver to employees certain disclosures, 
including financial statements). The SEC has also issued a concept release soliciting public 
comment about ways to modernize Rule 701. Concept Release on Compensatory Securities 
Offerings and Sales, 83 Fed. Reg. 34,958, 34,958 (proposed July 24, 2018) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 230). 
257 See Aran, supra note 118, at 109-10 (proposing that Rule 701 be amended to disclose waterfall 
analysis describing employee’s personalized expected payout in various exit scenarios with 
appropriate caveats about risk); see also Cable, supra note 118, at  (arguing that startup employees 
may be relatively capable investors in a company’s early stages but poorly equipped to navigate 
risks in mature startups); Fan, supra note 118, at 617-18 (arguing for enhanced disclosure 
requirements on unicorn companies); Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock Options: Golden Goose or 
Trojan Horse?, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 107, 186 (noting “[r]ank and file employees might be 
naïve” and suggesting “[p]erhaps certain private companies, such as unicorns, should adhere to 
the same financial disclosure requirements as public companies”). 
258 Other gatekeepers such as attorneys are present but may be ineffective or conflicted as they 
sometimes invest in their clients or take equity-based compensation. See COFFEE, supra note 247, 
at 362 (“Law and accounting . . . protect their autonomy; they resist broad duties to the public; 
and they invest very little in self-policing.”); John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline 
in Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 405, 408-10 (2002) 
(discussing that in venture capital and the technology sector “lawyer equity investment has 
become more routine”); see also Z. Jill Barclift, Corporate Responsibility: Ensuring Independent 
Judgment of the General Counsel—A Look at Stock Options, 81 N.D. L. REV. 1, 31 (2005) (concluding 
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SharesPost are largely free to follow client preferences in facilitating liquidity 
events.259 The marketplaces are presumably motivated by the fees that they earn for 
providing services and the incentive of their client companies is to create a liquidity 
opportunity for certain investors, founders, and employees while maintaining 
control over their shareholder base to avoid hitting the section 12(g) threshold for 
public reporting. With a hot market of willing buyers, this dynamic may give rise to 
a market failure for information to be produced.260 The lack of mandatory 
standardized disclosures could allow for some private companies to engage in 
issuances or facilitate trading without providing basic information such as audited 
financial statements that are fundamental building blocks in the public market for 
accurate pricing.  
A range of oversight and regulatory initiatives related to these trading 
marketplaces could strengthen private company accountability. The SEC could 
require them to collect and report data regarding the trading of private companies, 
including trading volume, participants, and the type of information disclosed. 
Consistent oversight of this trading data could better position the SEC to detect 
potential instances of securities fraud and launch further investigation. This pool of 
data would primarily capture larger, more mature private companies, which would 
be underinclusive by nature but a clear starting point involving little cost. 
Furthermore, the SEC could require a minimum level of disclosure for private 
secondary trading in order to fit within a registration exemption.261 The trading 
marketplaces would then be enlisted in the role of regulator along the lines that 
exchanges have played for over a century.262 These regulatory changes would not 
only have the benefit of enriching the informational environment of private 
company stock trading, but also incorporate the monitoring function of another set 
of gatekeepers—auditors.263 On the whole, these alternative mechanisms could 
significantly bolster efforts to increase public enforcement. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In a relatively short amount of time, our U.S. capital markets have bifurcated 
from a dominant public realm to a new reality of two markets—public and private. 	
that boards of public companies should eliminate stock options from compensation for the 
general counsel to maintain independent judgment and candor). 
259 Several years ago, SharesPost itself came under SEC scrutiny for matching buyers and sellers 
of private company stock without registering as a broker-dealer. SEC, Press Release 2012-43, 
SEC Announces Charges from Investigation of Secondary Market Trading of Private Company 
Shares, https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2012-2012-43htm. 
260 See Coffee, supra note 241, at 738 (discussing agency costs and conflicts of interests that 
prevent voluntary disclosure). 
261 See Pollman, supra note 23, at 222-26 (arguing for minimum disclosures in private company 
stock trading). 
262 See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange As Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (1997) (arguing 
the benefits of securities exchanges providing rules and enforcement mechanisms to protect 
investors and increase their returns). 
263 See COFFEE, supra note 247, at 108-91 (examining the role of auditors as gatekeepers). 
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The explosive growth of the private market has overtaken the public in terms of 
aggregate size. With companies staying private longer, much of their growth occurs 
outside the public market, subject to relatively light securities fraud scrutiny and 
enforcement.	 Without the discipline that mandatory disclosure can impose, 
information asymmetries abound as well as the characteristic ingredients for fraud. 	
The primary mechanism for policing securities fraud in the public market—
securities class actions—have not played a significant role in the private capital 
market. The Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence and practice has developed over decades 
through a public company paradigm. In the private company context, the lack of 
information-rich and transparent pricing, the presence of impediments to aggregate 
litigation, and different economics for bringing suit create friction for plaintiffs’ 
attorneys.  
It is therefore more pressing than ever to consider how and whether the private 
capital market is policed for securities fraud, and more broadly, the implications of 
allowing this market to grow relatively unfettered. This Article identifies several 
potential responses, including increasing public enforcement, adjusting the public-
private line, and implementing alternative mechanisms for accountability such as 
giving more information to employees and regulating trading marketplaces. 
Although caution is needed to avoid impinging upon the engine of growth and 
innovation that our private capital market represents, the potential harm to 
shareholders and vulnerable stakeholders likely warrants some mix of response that 
increases oversight, enforcement, and accountability. Looking further ahead, the 
policymaking imperative to take action raises deeper questions about the ongoing 
tenability of maintaining the health and integrity of these bifurcated markets. The 
past twenty-five years of opening the private market and relaxing its rules has fueled 
an alternate universe to its public parallel, which becomes harder to distinguish yet 
offers few of the same protections and disciplining mechanisms.  
 
 
